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ABSTRACT  
   
The reliability assessment of future distribution networks is an important 
issue in power engineering for both utilities and customers. This is due to the 
increasing demand for more reliable service with less interruption frequency and 
duration. This research consists of two main parts related to the evaluation of the 
future distribution system reliability. An innovative algorithm named the encoded 
Markov cut set (EMCS) is proposed to evaluate the reliability of the networked 
power distribution system. The proposed algorithm is based on the identification 
of circuit minimal tie sets using the concept of Petri nets. Prime number encoding 
and unique prime factorization are then utilized to add more flexibility in 
communicating between the systems states, and to classify the states as tie sets, 
cut sets, or minimal cut sets. Different reduction and truncation techniques are 
proposed to reduce the size of the state space. The Markov model is used to 
compute the availability, mean time to failure, and failure frequency of the 
network. A well-known Test Bed is used to illustrate the analysis (the Roy 
Billinton test system (RBTS)), and different load and system reliability indices are 
calculated. The method shown is algorithmic and appears suitable for off-line 
comparison of alternative secondary distribution system designs on the basis of 
their reliability.  
The second part assesses the impact of the conventional and renewable 
distributed generation (DG) on the reliability of the future distribution system. 
This takes into account the variability of the power output of the renewable DG, 
such as wind and solar DGs, and the chronological nature of the load demand. 
  ii 
The stochastic nature of the renewable resources and its influence on the 
reliability of the system are modeled and studied by computing the adequacy 
transition rate. Then, an integrated Markov model that incorporates the DG 
adequacy transition rate, DG mechanical failure, and starting and switching 
probability is proposed and utilized to give accurate results for the DG reliability 
impact. The main focus in this research is the conventional, solar, and wind DG 
units. However, the technique used appears to be applicable to any renewable 
energy source. 
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Chapter 1 
RELIABILITY OF POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS 
1.1 The Configuration of Power Distribution Systems  
The configuration of a distribution system can follow different 
arrangements based on the cost vs. reliability requirements. The distribution 
system can have multiple configurations including simple radial, primary 
selective, secondary selective, or secondary network. Each design will provide 
increasing reliability as well as increasing installation and operational costs. 


















Fig. 1.1 Typical radial distribution system 
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The radial configuration is the simplest and perhaps least reliable design 
of load distribution, where the power is flowing in one direction from one 
substation to the loads. The radial system consists of one substation with one or 
more main feeders and many laterals connecting the transformers and load points. 
The radial configuration is less reliable than a secondary networked configuration, 
but it is also less expensive and less complex due to fewer connections and 
protection devices. Radial configuration is usually located in the suburban and 
rural areas where the density of customers is low and their reliability requirement 
is not very high. The radial feeders in these areas are either in overhead lines or in 
underground cables. All system feeders and laterals are designed to operate in 
their full rated capacity. With the absence of an alternative power supply, there is 
not much redundancy with this arrangement. If there is any failure in the main 
feeder, the circuit breaker on the transformer side or the reclosers in the feeder 
will clear the fault and interrupt the loads downstream of the protection device.  
The secondary network is described as a configuration in which all the 
loads are connected via two or more alternative routes to the main supply. A 
secondary network is designed to provide highly reliable service to customers. 
Unlike the radial configuration, there are multiple transformers serving each 
network. The reliability of this secondary network is very high, and every load 
point in the network is supplied by two or more alternative power supplies. If a 
fault occurs on one of the transformers or primary feeders, there will not be any 
interruption to any load point and, therefore, no network interruption. This type of 
network can usually be found in downtown areas (central business districts) 
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where the density of loads is very high and the interruption cost is expensive. The 
installation cost of the secondary network is 175–200% of the cost of radial 
configuration [1]. This increased cost is because of the additional secondary 
connections, the overrated size of lines and transformers, and the protection 
devices.  
Radial systems have been in widespread use for almost 100 years, and a 
considerable level of engineering expertise has resulted from this basic design 
configuration. Nonetheless, it is prudent to look to the next generation of 
distribution systems, often referred to as ‘smart grids’, by incorporating networks, 
DG, energy storage, electronic controls, self-healing designs, and improved 
protection systems [2-4].  
The term “smart grid” is defined and used in several ways, but a common 
characteristic is the growth usage of advanced information technology (IT) in 
electric distribution systems. The future grid will bring smaller DGs into the grid 
and the grid should be more flexible to any changes from the renewable sources in 
the system. The renewable resources are expected to be integrated at any location 
in the grid. Furthermore, the widespread use of DG will force the distribution 
system to become bidirectional, thereby creating more challenges in designing 
and operating the system. 
Another advanced aspect of the future grid will be the smart 
communications among the devices in the system. This can be done by building a 
processor in every protection device, transformer, switch, etc., and making them 
capable of communicating with each other. The live communication is also 
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between the customers and the utilities so that the customers can manage their 
energy consumption. Some key changes to the future systems include integrating 
small-scale distributed generators and renewable energy, greater level of storage, 




















Fig. 1.2 Smart grid key factors 
One of the main incentives for smart grids is to enhance the reliability of 
the power system by integrating small-scale resources and reconfiguring the 
distribution system to be a unidirectional network. The complexity of the future 
distribution systems will require enhanced techniques to evaluate the reliability 
and minimize the frequency and duration of the outages. Several studies discussed 
the effect of the DG in the load and system reliability indices [5, 6]. When a fault 
occurs in the smart grid, the system then will break into islanded areas or clusters 
where each area has the capability to survive based on its resources and 
connections until the system can regroup into a complete system.  
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In general, the reliability of the future distribution systems can be 
improved by enhancing the fault detection techniques, fault isolation, restoration 
capabilities, and incorporating smarter information technologies in controlling 
and operating the system [7].     
1.2 Reliability of Power Distribution Systems  
Reliability has been a subject of great interest in most of the 
manufacturing and services applications [8]. The reliability definition based on 
the IEEE 90 standard is “the ability of a system or component to perform its 
required functions under stated conditions for a specified period of time” [9]. In 
electric power distribution systems, reliability is a key issue in design and 
operation—especially in view of sensitive, digitally controlled loads. 
Analyzing and evaluating the distribution system’s reliability is important 
to improve the operational and maintenance performance of the system and 
provide highly reliable electricity with high quality. Some sources of power 
problems are in nature form, such as, tornadoes, lightning, wind, earthquakes, and 
snow. Manmade problems include automotive accidents, vandalism, and 
inadvertent contact with overhead conductors, distribution operator errors, and 
fires. These factors are extremely difficult to predict or control, thereby making it 
hard to avoid power outages. Some factors that can be controlled or optimized 
include vehicle or construction accidents, overloads, animal contacts, and 
equipment failure or wear out. Most power problems can be reduced by 
implementing underground connections, but this result in increased cost and 
maintenance inflexibility.  
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The overall reliability evaluation of power systems should include 
generation, transmission, and distribution reliability studies. In reference [10], the 
reliability of distribution systems is evaluated by considering the impact of the 
failures from the generation and transmission subsystems. In practice, all 
reliability studies are conducted in relatively small local subsystems since the 
complete network from the source to the load is enormous. In reality, it is also 
difficult to collect the necessary data for reliability evaluations. Utilities are 
conservative or sometimes reluctant to release actual reliability data and failure 
rates. Several references have investigated methods to collect and categorize data 
that can be used in reliability studies [11, 12].  
The performance of distribution systems may be quantified by measures of 
voltage regulation and classical power distribution engineering issues including 
evaluation of losses, power factor, overhead versus underground designs [13-15], 
counts of anomalous events [16-19], and power quality at the point of end use [20, 
21]. Reference [17] specifically addresses the value of ‘count indices’ (i.e., 
counting undesired events such as outages or low voltage cases) for the purpose 
of standardized distribution system planning. Reference [18] addresses the 
probabilistic analysis of these indices. In recent years, the move to use DG 
resources in the distribution system and the impact of these resources on 
distribution system reliability has also been considered, as shown in [22–27]. 
References [21, 28, 29] are samples of distribution system engineering analysis 
and design—an area that has received considerable attention for over 100 years. 
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These references are only a small sample of the literature since the full literature 
is voluminous. 
The reliability evaluation can be divided into two parts: modeling of the 
reliability characteristics of the components, and the calculation of the reliability 
of the system. In modeling the components reliability data, it is a common 
practice to assume that the failures are independent of each other. Each 
component of the system is modeled with a different number of states 
(commonly, two or three states). The two states include the up state (working 
condition) and the down state (repair condition), and the additional third state can 
be the planned or scheduled maintenance state. 
To evaluate the reliability of a system, a mathematical or graphical model 
of the system should be used and designed to reflect its reliability characteristics. 
The models can be either analytical or simulation. Analytical models represent the 
system by a set of exact or approximate mathematical models and evaluate the 
reliability based on this mathematical representation of each state. The Markov 
model is one of the popular analytical techniques to evaluate the reliability of the 
power system. All transition rates between the states are assumed, making it 
possible to evaluate the steady-state probability of the states. The Markov chain is 
one of the best models that can represent the dynamic behavior of the system, but 
it is also very complicated to construct the transition matrix for a large number of 
components.  
Another widely used technique for reliability assessment in many fields is 
Monte Carlo (MC) simulation. In MC simulation, the reliability is evaluated 
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repeatedly using parameters drawn from random distributions to simulate the 
stochastic problems [19, 30, 31]. Usually, MC simulation is used when other 
deterministic methods failed to apply and can be useful in evaluating the mean 
time to failure for very complicated or large scale systems.  
The advantage of the MC simulation is that it can simulate almost any 
system and any failure mode. The disadvantages, on the other hand, are that it 
requires long runs (i.e., many samples) and the accuracy of the output may depend 
on the number of runs and variables in the system.   
In applications of complex systems, analytical techniques usually include 
some simplifications or assumptions. However, the simulation technique can 
simulate and include any system behavior with less approximation. The analytical 
models give the same numerical results each run since the model contains a fixed 
mathematical representation for the system, whereas the results from the 
simulation models differ in each run since the system characteristics are randomly 
changing in each run [32]. The solution time for the analytical techniques are 
relatively shorter than that of the simulation run time. The simulation time can be 
very high in complex systems and in applications where several reliability indices 
are required. 
1.3 Motivation for This Research 
The massive blackout in the northeastern United States and Canada on 
August 2003 brought more public interest in the reliability of the grid. Moreover, 
the power industry has become a competitive environment under deregulation, 
and the continuity of power supply to the customers is significant. Deregulation 
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seeks to create a competitive environment in the power area to obtain better 
service and lower cost. Therefore, utilities are seeking more accurate data and 
predictions about the electrical service and its availability to keep their customers 
satisfied.  
A distribution system is highly complex and contains a large number of 
connections and components, which make it the greatest contributor to the 
unavailability of power supply to the customers. In fact, the distribution system 
accounts for almost 40% of the overall power system and 80% of customer 
reliability problems [33]. Moreover, contemporary loads are often digital in 
nature, and these loads are frequently sensitive to interruptions and, indeed, many 
other power quality problems. The customers themselves are perhaps becoming 
more sensitive to interruptions due to the possibility of industrial manufacturing 
interruption, commercial loss of sales, and residential nuisance. Sophisticated 
control systems may actually exacerbate the impact of service interruptions. 
Competition in power marketing may be impacted as well—industrial customers 
may seek to locate places where power system reliability is high. For these 
reasons, distribution system design and operation is critical for the power 
industry. One common characteristic among industrial and commercial customers 
is that the cost of downtime is enormous. As the availability and the reliability of 
the power system become more sensitive to the customers and utilities, more 
research and techniques are needed to evaluate the reliability of power system.  
Distribution systems are now in a significant transitional phase; the system 
is shifting from passive distribution systems with unidirectional power flow to 
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active distribution networks with bidirectional flow and small scale generators. 
This can present an extraordinary challenge for the business of electric generation 
and delivery. Future distribution systems are often referred to as “smart grids”, 
where more intelligent technologies are integrated to the system to monitor, 
control, and operate the system. Therefore, the reliability of the future grids is 
expected to become more challenging issue in the near future, with more complex 
configurations and an increase in small scale units. 
Taking into account the ongoing deregulation process in many countries 
and the rapid development in the DG technologies, there may be a need to 
reconsider or to extend and enhance the traditional approach to evaluate the 
reliability of the distribution system. Furthermore, the increased demand for more 
reliability introduces more networked secondary systems, making it complicated 
to evaluate the reliability of the distribution systems. Conventional methods to 
evaluate the reliability of the secondary networks will be more complex and time 
consuming. Enhanced or new methods are needed to accelerate the evaluation 
process and increase its process.  
1.4 Scope and Objectives of This Research  
The central objective of this research is to examine and develop 
engineering methods to evaluate and increase the reliability of the next generation 
of power distribution systems. The following are key components of this work: 
 To examine, quantify, and develop engineering designs for networked 
distribution systems. Analyzing the reliability of a network means 
evaluating the ability of two or more connected nodes to ‘communicate’ 
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successfully given the failure probability of all components or elements in 
the system. Such analysis is usually complicated and consumes substantial 
computation time since it requires an analysis of the states of the failed 
components and analysis of the routing within the network in a 
combinatorial fashion.  
 To utilize advanced circuit analytical techniques such as Petri nets and 
Markov process analysis to analyze the reliability of the networked 
systems. In power systems, as in many practical systems, the system has 
different discrete states and operates in one state and can change its state 
at any time. The reliability of these systems can be analyzed using 
continuous time Markov chains (CTMC). The Petri nets concept can also 
be used to solve the connectivity problem in complex systems. The 
minimal tie sets can be found using this concept, and these sets are used in 
Markov models to evaluate the reliability.  
 To propose different reduction and truncation techniques to reduce the 
system connections and its state space for ease in analysis. The reduction 
techniques are used to exclude irrelevant load buses and their associated 
connections from the reliability model of each load point under study. The 
truncation method is used to reduce the state space by excluding states that 
are considered rare events.  
 To use prime number theory to code the design of power distribution 
systems. In the application of prime number encoding to the evaluation of 
distribution reliability, prime numbers are used to encode the sections of 
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the power distribution network to classify the state space as minimal tie 
sets, tie sets, minimal cut sets, and cut sets. Prime number encoding-
decoding adds more flexibility in finding and categorizing the states in the 
Markov model. 
 To examine networked distribution systems. A reliability evaluation study 
quantifies reliability based on component reliability data and can be used 
to evaluate past performance and to identify the weak points or 
components in the system that introduce a high number of power problems 
to the whole network. To increase the reliability of the system, it can be 
reconfigured or the component can be replaced. Moreover, the reliability 
assessment is used to evaluate the reliability for different network designs 
during the design phase. Then, the designer can compare the 
configurations and select the optimal design. 
 To assess the conventional and renewable DGs impact on the reliability of 
the networked distribution system. The stochastic nature of the renewable 
resources and its effect on the reliability of the system are modeled and 
studied. Then, the DG model and the load demand model are integrated to 
the distribution system reliability model to evaluate the load and system 
reliability indices.  
All the techniques used in this report are interconnected in an algorithm 
named encoded Markov cut sets (EMCS) and will be explained in detail in 
Chapter 3. This algorithm will be used to evaluate the reliability of future 
distribution systems. A roadmap for the complete analysis is shown in Fig. 1.3.  
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Fig. 1.3 Roadmap for evaluating the reliability of future distribution system using 
EMCS 
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Chapter 2 
DISTRIBUTION POWER SYSTEM RELIABILITY CALCULATIONS 
2.1 Quantification of Distribution System Reliability 
Reliability is an important issue in any designed system or product. 
Customers and users do not expect any failure or interruption of the service since 
the failure can be expensive or insecure. It is important to differentiate between 
the power quality and system reliability. System reliability is more concerned 
with the continuity of the service (sustained and momentary interruptions), 
whereas power quality pertains to other power problems such as voltage 
fluctuations, harmonic distortion, and variations in the wave shape or magnitude. 
 A typical reliability study focuses on the probability of a component or a 
system to operate as intended or to fail. This probability does not provide specific 
definitive information regarding exactly when or how long an outage will occur. 
For this reason, it is important to introduce other indices that will reveal the 
frequency and duration of outages.  
In practice, system average interruption frequency index (SAIFI) and 
system average interruption duration index (SAIDI) are two commonly used 
indices used to evaluate the frequency and duration of the interruptions that 
customers experience in the period of study (typically one year). These two 
indices are related to the configuration of a system and the probability of each 
component in the system to fail. The indices are used in reliability evaluation to 
study the effect of components on reliability and to compare different 
configurations based on their reliability performance. One important route to the 
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examination of reliability relates to the probabilistic modeling of networks and 
systems in general. For example, Billinton and others (e.g., [34–37]) have 
employed the basic properties of the probability of failure of components in series 
and parallel (including vector-matrix operational analysis) to quantify the 
probability of failure of a system or network.  
Major events such as severe weather conditions are usually excluded when 
calculating the reliability indices since the weather conditions can have a major 
effect on the indices based on the location and configuration of the system. 
Excluding major events allow the utilities to respond to the real changes of the 
system’s reliability. Utilities used different approaches to define and exclude the 
major events from the reliability indices. One approach to classify any event as a 
major event is when the event causes 10% of the utility customers to lose service 
for 24 hours [38]. Another approach to classify the major events is when 15% of 
the customers experience an outage during the severe weather condition [38].  
The duration and frequency of mis-operation are significant in evaluating 
the reliability of a device or system. In this report, the event count indices will be 
studied, principally the SAIDI and the SAIFI, 
      
                                   
                                   
 
      
                                 
                                   
  
The SAIDI index reveals the average time the customer is interrupted in 
minutes (or hours) in one year. The SAIFI index reveals how often these 
interruptions occur on the average for each customer. Both indices have been 
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widely used in North America as measures of the effectiveness of distribution 
systems [16, 33]. Both indices are carried out (i.e., averaged) typically over a one-
year interval; SAIDI is usually expressed in hours per customer, and SAIFI in 
failures per customer. (Further system reliability indices can be found in 
Appendix A) 
   Most utilities have to report their reliability indices to regulatory bodies. 
In a 2008 survey, 35 states and Washington DC required routine reporting of 
SAIDI and SAIFI from the utilities to the public utility commission [39]. Most 
utilities exclude severe weather outages and planned outages from reliability 
indices because in most storm outages, the utility cannot control the incident or 
severity of the storms. Customers also may be notified before any planned 
outages (e.g., maintenance) so that the impact of the outage will be minimized.   
2.2 Calculating the Reliability Using System Theoretic Concepts  
Even though availability and reliability are used interchangeably in several 
papers in the literature, they are not the same in concept and values. The 
reliability basically represents the probability that a component or a system will 
perform its designed function without any failure under the normal working 
environment. The reliability does not reflect or contain any time to repair the 
failed component. It mainly reflects how long the system is expected to work at a 
specific time before it fails.  
The availability, on the other hand, is the probability that the component 
or the system is working as expected during its operational cycle. It shows how 
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share of time the system is working. Availability depends on both the expected 
time to fail and time to repair the component or the system. The availability is,  
              
       
                 
  
For continuously operating systems such as power systems, it is more 
informative to study the availability of the components and system to address the 
quality of service provided to the customers. The term “reliability” will be used in 
this report as a general word that represents all aspects of the study (e.g., 
availability, unavailability, failure frequency, duration) rather than a quantity or a 
value. Generally speaking, system reliability can be defined as the probability of 
at least one minimal set of components working properly between the input and 
output. This set of components is called tie or path set in graph theory.  
The life of the power system equipment may be divided into three 
intervals: infant mortality, useful life, and wear out period. The useful life period 
is typically where the reliability evaluation is conducted. Some papers include the 
wear out period in modeling the components using probability distributions [40]. 
It is also common in the literature that the power system components down times 
and up times assumed to follow an exponential distribution function. Many 
components in power systems fail in purely random fashion, and the failure rate is 
assumed to be the same at any time during the component’s useful life. Constant 
failure rate leads to the exponential distribution modeling where the failure rate is 
constant with time [30, 41].  
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Distribution system components in this research are assumed to be 
repairable components with a time to repair or to restore service. Most 
components in power systems are repairable or replaceable. If a component is 
repaired, it is assumed that it will perform its function as new component with the 
same failure rate. The time it takes for each component to fail is called the mean 
time to failure (MTTF), or simply Tf. Similarly, the time to restore service or to 
repair the faulty component is called the mean time to repair (MTTR), or simply 
Tr. Note that both Tf and Tr are the average values over a long period of time and 
over many cycles of operate/fail-repair/operate/fail-repair/…and it is assumed that 
the component has only two states: either up or down. The time it takes for a 
component to fail and to be repaired is called the mean time between failures 
(MTBF), or simply the mean cycle time, Tfr where, 
MTBF = MTTF + MTTR 
          (2.1) 
The mean time to failure, Tf, and mean time of repair, Tr, and ‘one average cycle’ 
of time to fail and repair’ are shown in Fig. 2.1. 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
MTTF MTTR  
Fig. 2.1 Depiction of a ‘cycle’ of mean time to failure and mean time to repair 
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The reciprocal of the mean cycle time is defined as the mean failure 
frequency and is denoted as f,   
  
 
    
 
 
         
 (2.2) 
Note that MTBF, MTTF, and MTTR have the units of time, generally hours, and f 
has the units of ‘per hour’. The probability of a component to be in the operational 
state is called the availability, denoted as A, and the probability to be in the 
failure state is called the unavailability, denoted as U. A and U will be used in this 
report as the notation for availability and unavailability. The availability and 
unavailability are related to MTTF and MTTR as follows: 
   
    
    
 
    
         
 (2.3) 
   
    
    
 
    
         
  (2.4) 
The frequency and duration of interruptions for a component over one 
year are defined as average interruption frequency (AIF) and average interruption 
duration (AID) [22]. The AIF for a component is defined as a number of failures 
over one year and can be expressed as:  
            
    
         
 (2.5) 
where i is the bus or feeder number. Similarly, the AID is the duration in hours for 
all interruptions in one year and expressed as: 
                          (2.6) 
  20 
The failure duration (FD) can also be defined as the average duration of a 
single failure. Another important load index is the energy not supplied (ENS) 
during interruptions. The FD and ENS can be calculated as follows:  
    
    
    
 (2.7) 
             
  (2.8) 
Where     
  is the annual average power for bus i. For two components connected 
in a series, the system will perform its designed function if both components are 
working (i.e., they are both up). If there is a failure in any one of these two 
components, the receiving end will experience an interruption or outage (i.e., the 
load is down) [22]. The availability of this system can be expressed as: 
          
   
       
   
       
  (2.9) 
Similarly, for a system of two parallel components, the load will 
experience an outage if both components fail at the same time. The two parallel 
components probability is: 
              
   
       
   
       
 (2.10) 
For two simple components in either series or parallel, Tf and Tr are related 
to the MTTF and the MTTR the entire system, namely   
     
  
 respectively. For 
two components in series, the frequency of failure for the equivalent system equal 
to:   
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In power systems, consider the adjustment of the above equation to 
account for a practical assumption that a second component cannot fail when the 
first component has already failed. The equivalent frequency will then be:  
              (2.11) 
After substituting all variables from (2.2) and (2.3): 
   
       
(       )         
  (2.12) 
To find the equivalent failure cycle period (Tfrs):  





         
 (2.13) 
Then, using (2.2) and (2.3), the equivalent time to fail and time to repair can be 
found as: 
            
      
       
 (2.14) 
           
(       )(       )        
       
 (2.15) 
A similar procedure can be used to find the equivalent variables in two parallel 
components. For two parallel components, both components should fail at the 
same time to cause an outage or service interruption to the customer. The 
frequency of failures is then equal to:  
             (2.16) 
The relationship is shown in Table 2.1 [34, 35]. The results in Table 2.1 
assume that the power supply is 100% reliable, and outages of components are 
probabilistically independent. Further, the results in Table 2.1 show approximate 
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formulas for the case that Tf >> Tr. Note that in typical power distribution 
engineering, Tf is in the order of tens of thousands of hours, and Tr is in the order 
of a few hours. The exact formulas are also shown Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 Equivalent times of failure and repair of series and parallel components 
Equivalents   
  






Tr << Tf 
Series 
      
       
 
             
       
 
Parallel 
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Parallel 
                    
       
 
      
       
 
 
It is possible to combine the results of Table 2.1, Eq. (2.5) and Eq. (2.6) to 
obtain the AID and AIF for a receiving end bus, fed by either two series 





 (as ‘seen’ at the receiving bus), as shown in Table 2.2. As in 
Table 2.1, the equivalent AID and AIF of two simple components in series or 
parallel assume that Tf >> Tr and that the supply bus is 100% reliable. The results 
in Table 2.2 are simply obtained using the results of Table 2.1, followed by the 
definition of the equivalent AID and AIF at a power delivery bus being   
      
and        
     
   ⁄ , respectively. Most of the indices depend on the 
interruption frequency or interruption duration. Billinton and Allan [41] show 
how repair time and failure rate may be used in the radial case to find reliability at 
distribution system buses.  
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Table 2.2 Equivalent AIF and AID as a function of the AID and AIF of each 
component 
 Series Parallel 
                
                 
    
 
                
        
    
 
 
SAIFI is the average interruptions frequency per customer and can be 
calculated by finding the interruption frequency of all buses divided by the 
number of customers connected in the system: 
       
∑       
 
   
  
 (2.17) 
where Ni is the total number of customers connected to a given bus i, NT is the 
total number of customers in the system, and B is the total number of buses. 
Similarly, SAIDI is simply the summation of the interruption duration of all 
buses, divided by the number of customers connected in the system: 
       
∑       
 
   
  
 (2.18) 
2.3 Markov Models for Distribution System Reliability Evaluation 
In power systems, as in many practical systems, the system has different 
discrete states, and it operates in one state and can change its state at any time. 
The reliability of these systems can be analyzed using CTMC. The objective in 
the reliability evaluation of the power distribution system is to determine the 
availability, mean time to failure, interruption duration, and interruption 
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frequency of each load point in the system. The interruption occurs when the load 
is disconnected from the source. It is important to detect the system states where 
the link between the load and the source is disconnected. Then, each state can be 
identified as a working (normal operation) and not working (outage) state, which 
is then incorporated in the analysis of the Markov model to compute the steady 
state probability, mean time to failure, duration, and frequency.  
 The technique to solve the connectivity problems and to classify each 
state based on the continuous connection between the load and the source will be 
explained in the next chapter. Markov analysis used to find the steady state 
probability, mean time to failure, and failure frequency will be explained in this 
section.  
In many applications, the majority of the components in the system have 
two possible states—up and down. The transition rate from state 1 (up) to state 2 
(down) is called the failure rate (λ), and it is estimated by counting the number of 
failures divided by the total operation time in one year. The rate of transition from 
the down state to up state is called the repair rate (µ), and it is calculated by 
counting the number of repairs, divided by the total duration of all repairs. This 





Fig. 2.2 Two states binary model 
  25 
The number of states in the Markov model using the binary model is 
related to the number of lines and components included in the study. Let n be the 
number of components in the system; the total number of states will be 2
n
. Each 
state denotes the status of the components as working (up) or not working (down). 
Each component status can be defined as follows:  
i=1: if the component working (up)  
i=0: if the components not working (down). 
The general state space will be:  
S= {S1, S2, S3,…, SN} 
where N=2
n
 and S=i1i2i3…in. As an example, for two components system, the 
states can be defined as:  
S1= 11 (both working)  
S2= 10 (working, not working) 
S3= 01 (not working, working)  
S4= 00 (both not working).  
The state transition diagram (STD) and the state transition matrix (STM) for the 

















      
      
      







Fig. 2.3 STD and STM for the two components system 
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2.3.1 Using Markov Models to Calculate Reliability 
The time dependent probabilities can be found by solving the Markov 
















































































































where   is the coefficient matrix that can be formed from the transition rates 
matrix (σ-matrix). The long run (or steady state) probabilities can be found by 
solving the set of Markov differential equations (Kolmogorov equations) with the 
conditions that the sum of all probabilities equal to 1 and all time derivatives of 
the probabilities equal zero [31]. The derivatives can be replaced with a zero 




























1  (2.21) 
The matrix representation after substituting the last row of  , , and  ̇ 
with the summation of all the probabilities equal to one is:  






















































































Equation (2.22) is solved to find the steady state probabilities for all the 
state. The states can be classified based on the system connection as up (working) 
or down (not working). Then, the steady state probabilities can be added together 
for each group to calculate the availability and unavailability of the system.  
  To find the expected average time to move from state i to state j, consider 
the state space in Fig. 2.3. The average time to travel from state 1 to state 4, where 
state 4 is assumed to be the only (down) state in the system, is calculated as 
follows:  
 [   ]  
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 [   ] (2.23) 
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 [   ] (2.25) 
 [   ]    (2.26) 
where E[T11] is the average expected time to move from state 1 to state 4. In 
general,                denotes the first passage time to move from state               
to any down state in the state space. 
The time or the number of steps the system takes before entering the 
absorbing state can be found by evaluating the fundamental matrix of the 
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absorbing Markov chains N [31]. The fundamental matrix N [31] can be found by 
solving:  
  [   ]   (2.27) 
The matrix N is the average time that the system resides in each transient state or 
how many steps it takes before it enters one of the absorbing states. In the 
applications where the system or component is repairable, there is no absorbing 
states since the system can be repaired and maintains its operational state again. 
The failure states can be assigned as absorbing states to compute the average time 
or steps before entering any of the failure states. In this case, the average time the 
system operates before failing can be computed from matrix N after classifying all 
the failure states as absorbing states. This average time is called the mean time to 
failure (MTTF). 
Besides finding the steady state probabilities of the system and the mean 
time to failure and repair, it is also useful to find the frequency of occurrence of 
the down states of the system. To find the expected time of residence for state i, 
all other states are considered as absorbing states. The expected frequency then 
can be written as: 
     ∑    
 
   . (2.28) 
From (2.28), the expected frequency of any state is the probability of being in that 
state multiplied by the rates of departure from the same state. 
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2.3.2 Merging of States  
In power systems, it is more beneficial to evaluate the expected number of 
outages and how long the system can run without the customer realizing service 
has been interrupted.  The steady state probability of each state can be found by 
solving the limiting probabilities and the Markov coefficient matrix. Then, the 
availability and unavailability of the two system events (up and down) are 
computed by adding all the up and down states. 
      ∑  
 
   
         ∑  
 
   
 (2.29) 
where u and d are the number of up and down states, respectively.  
The MTTF is the mean time the system takes to move from the up state 
(operational state) to the down state (failure state). In most of the application, the 
initial state of the system is in the normal operation state where all the 
components are up. What is important here is to compute the mean time to leave 
this state and enter one of the down states. In power systems, any down state can 
be an absorbing state since what is important in the reliability study of the power 
system is the frequency and duration of the outages seen by the customer and not 
the combination of component failures. The MTTF can be calculated for the 
system, assuming that the initial state is in the normal operation state and using 
the truncated matrix Su and fundamental matrix Nud.   
The failure frequency is equivalent to the frequency of occurrence of all 
the down states. To merge all the down states into a single aggregate state, the 
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state frequencies are added together excluding any mutual occurrence between 
them. The merged frequency of two down states [31] is: 
                 (2.30) 
where fij is the frequency of occurrence from state i to state j and vice versa for fji.   
To find the frequency of the merged down states, the transition matrix is 
modified to remove any mutual transition rates between any down states. Then, 
this modified transition matrix is used with the steady state probabilities for all 
states to compute the frequency of the merged down states. The frequency of each 
down state can be computed as: 
     ∑   
 
 
   
 (2.31) 
where i is the number of down states and    
  is the transition rate from the down 
state i to the up state j. The system failure frequency can then be computed as: 
        ∑   
 
   
 (2.32) 
2.3.3 Equivalent Series and Parallel Models  
As the number of the states in the system becomes large, the reliability 
evaluation of the Markov model can become problematic and time consuming. It 
is possible, though, to reduce the number of states and the size of the Markov 
model matrices by combining the series and parallel components in the system 
[30, 31].  
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In the case where two components are connected in series, the MTTF is 
the reciprocal of the sum of the two components’ failure rates. Therefore, the 
equivalent failure rate for two series component (    is: 
         (2.33) 
The equivalent repair rate    for two series components can be expressed as: 
   
             
              
 (2.34) 
For two parallel components connected in parallel with full redundancy, 
the system will fail if both components fail at the same time. The equivalent 
repair rate (    is: 
         (2.35) 
and the equivalent failure rate (    is: 
   
             
              
 (2.36) 
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Chapter 3 
THE ENCODED MARKOV CUT SET ALGORITHM 
3.1 Using Graph Theory in Reliability Evaluation 
 Distribution systems can be modeled with a unidirectional probabilistic 
graph whose vertices represent the nodes (or loads) and the edges represent the 
links (or lines). The nodes are assumed to be 100% reliable, or perfect, where the 
probability to work equal to one. However, the links are assumed imperfect with 
associated probability to fail for each component or area. Another important 
assumption is that all the components in the system are independent from each 
other in their failures. Without this assumption, the correlation of failure events 
makes the problem complicated and difficult to solve. The assumption of 
independent failures may not be accurate in actual power systems. A lightning 
strike or a storm may cause a simultaneous failure of several components.  
For any distribution network, there are four line sets:  
1. Tie set (TS); 
2. Minimal tie set (MTS);  
3. Cut set (CS); and 
4. Minimal cut set (MCS). 
A tie set is any set of lines that connects the source (input) and the load (output). 
The tie set can include additional lines ΩL if the elements of ΩL are removed from 
the set, resulting in the remaining lines connecting the input and output. Unlike 
the tie set, the minimal tie set is the minimum set of lines where if one line were 
removed from the set, the input-output connection would be broken. Fig. 3.1 
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explains the difference between the tie set and minimal tie set. In Fig. 3.1(a), the 
tie set includes lines 3, 4, 5, and 6. If line 6 is removed from the set, lines 3, 4, and 
5 will link between the input and the output. On the other hand, in Fig. 3.1(b) the 
minimal tie set contains lines 3, 4, 5, and if one of these lines is removed, the link 















Tie Set (3, 4, 5, 6)
(a)
Minimal Tie Set (3, 4, 5)
(b)  
Fig. 3.1 Illustration of the difference between tie set and minimal tie set 
On the other hand, Fig. 3.2(a) shows a network with a cut set where lines 
4, 5, 7 are disconnected from the circuit and thus there is no path between the 
input and output. The cited lines form a cut set because if at least one element is 
reconnected, the output may still be disconnected from the input. On the other 
hand, in Fig. 3.2(b) lines 5, 7 are disconnected, and this set is called a minimal cut 
set because connecting one of these elements will link input and output.  













Cut Set (4, 5, 7)
(a)
Minimal Cut Set (5, 7)
(b)  
Fig. 3.2 Illustration of the difference between cut set and minimal cut set 
The TS, MTS, CS, and MCS are useful in evaluating the reliability of 
small systems using Markov models. These sets are used to classify all the states 
as up or down states to then construct Markov matrices and compute the 
reliability of the system. The difficulty of the method lies in identifying the tie 
and cut sets, especially in large complex networked systems. Several methods are 
available in the literature for identifying the MCSs of complex networks (e.g., 
[42, 43]). For large systems, the number of combinations increases as the 
combinatorial of the number of system components, thereby making identification 
of the cut set components by inspection becomes difficult and time consuming. 
These reliability studies are generally off-line studies, but because of the 
combinatorial nature of the calculation, the calculation time is nonetheless an 
issue. Thus, it is important to find a better method to determine all the TSs and 
CSs for large and complex systems. 
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3.2 Distribution Network Reliability Using EMCS Algorithm 
Different levels are proposed in this research to evaluate the reliability of 
networked systems using cut and tie sets, prime number encoding, Petri nets, and 
Markov models. The flow diagram for the proposed encoded Markov cut set 
(EMCS) algorithm levels is shown in Fig. 3.3 [44]. 
Reduction Level
R1: Irrelevant load points
R2: Series & Parallel sections
R3: Irrelevant sections
R4: Sections of the 
irrelevant load points
Truncation level
T1: Maximum number of 
simultaneous failures
Encoding Level 
- Prime number encoding 
- Master list (ML)
Petri nets Level
Minimal tie sets (MTS)
Classification Level
- Prime numbers encoding
- Tie sets (TS) , Minimal cut 




-Mean time to failure (MTTF)
- Failure frequency (f) 
Reliability Indices 
- Load point indices ( A, U, 
MTTF, AIF,AID, FD)
- System indices ( SAIFI, SAIDI, 
CAIDI, ASAI, ASUI, ENS)
Study System
- Connection matrix (A)
-Failure & repair rates (ʎ,µ) 
-Number of customers 
-Load average 
 
Fig. 3.3 Flow chart for the proposed EMCS algorithm 
The proposed levels will be explained in details in Sections 3.3-3.7. They 
are briefly explained as follows: 
 Reduction level: Different reduction techniques are proposed and applied 
to simplify the assessment and decrease the number of segments included 
in each load point reliability calculation. The goal behind reducing the 
number of segments or sections is to decrease the number of states and 
transition matrix size used in the Markov analysis. The accuracy of the 
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calculation should not be affected by all the reduction techniques used in 
this level.   
 Truncation level: The Markov state space can be truncated according to 
the maximum allowed number of simultaneous failures in the system. The 
number and size of the truncated state space is specified based on the 
required accuracy level of the assessment.  
 Encoding level: The number of states in any typical complex system is 
considered to be large with a relatively large number of components 
included in each state. Encoding all the components and then all the states 
will simplify and accelerate classifying the states and constructing Markov 
matrices. A master list (ML) with all encoded IDs and flags is created to 
be used later to categorize the state space.  
 Petri nets level: In this level, the Petri nets concept is used to find the 
minimal tie sets (MTS). All the minimal tie sets can be found using this 
technique, which are then used to recognize the tie sets from the state 
population.  
 Classification level: The unique factorization theorem and the encoded 
IDs for all MTS are used to find all tie sets (TS) in the state space. Then, 
the remaining states are classified as minimal cut sets (MCS) or cut sets 
(CS). 
 Markov model level: After classifying all the states as MTS, TS, MCS, 
and CS, these sets are used to tag all the states as up or down states. Then, 
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Markov models are used to compute all the load and system reliability 
indices.    
3.3 Reduction and Truncation Techniques 
In evaluating the reliability of the networked system, the computational 
time is large and related directly to the size of the network. Therefore, researchers 
are trying to find simplified techniques for reducing the size of the network and 
expediting the computation time [45, 46]. In this thesis, to reduce the number of 
states in the system, different reduction methods are proposed and applied to the 
system’s connection. The number of states is directly related to the number of 
components or sections in the system. The reduction methods reduce the number 
of sections and nodes in the system without affecting the accuracy of the 
reliability indices. This is due to the assumption that all the lines and transformers 
are protected with 100% reliable devices that can isolate faults instantaneously. 
Four different reduction levels (R1, R2, R3, and R4) and a truncation technique 
(T1) are used in this study as shown in the subsequent subsections. 
3.3.1 Irrelevant Load Points 
Each load point in the system is evaluated individually and independently. 
When the load point is assessed, all other load points have no influence on the 
reliability of the load point under study. Therefore, every other load point is 
considered irrelevant to the load point under study. In the connection matrix, all 
the load nodes—except the load node under study (e.g., node x)—are removed 
from the network, since they do not have any reliability value in the evaluation 
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process. This technique will reduce the number of nodes by L-1 where L is the 
total number of loads in the system.     
3.3.2 Series and Parallel Sections 
In the second reduction stage, all the series and parallel sections or 
components in the system are merged. One node and one section are eliminated 
when two components are combined in series. The parallel combination will not 
affect the number of nodes in the system but will reduce the number of sections 
by one. 
3.3.3 Irrelevant Sections 
In the third reduction stage, the irrelevant sections are removed from the 
model. The irrelevant sections can be defined as sections that do not share any 
node with any possible path between the source and the load under study. The 
only point at which the irrelevant section is connected to any possible route is the 
100% reliable source bus.  
The method used to distinguish all the irrelevant sections from all the possible 
routes between the source and the load is as follows:  
1. Let    be the connection matrix and M the input-output vector where    = 
[aij] and aij = 1 if there is a line or component between i,j, and    and aij are 
equal to 0 otherwise, and vector M is a column vector where mi = 1 for i = 
source or destination and mi = 0 otherwise. 
2. Delete the input element from M vector and the associated row in the    
matrix.  
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3. Multiply each column in    by M.  
4. If the sum of the multiplication does not equal zero, update M by adding the 
column in    to M, then tag the column in   .    
5. Repeat steps 3-4 until all the columns have been investigated.  
6. Delete all untagged columns (sections).  
3.3.4 Sections of the Irrelevant Load Points 
The last reduction stage is applied when all the lines and components 
connecting between all possible routes and irrelevant loads are removed from the 
connection matrix. There is no effect from those load nodes and their associated 
segments since all the lines and transformers are assumed to be protected with 
100% reliable devices that can isolate the faults instantaneously.     
3.3.5 Maximum Simultaneous Failures 
Assuming that each component in the system has two operational modes, 
either up or down, the total number of states in the system will be   , where n is 
the number of components in the system. Since the state space can be extremely 
large with a large number of components, a simple and direct truncation method 
can be used to reduce the number of states. Truncation means deleting states 
having more than a pre-specified number of simultaneous failures.  By definition, 
the maximum simultaneous failures in the system are set to be 3. In power 
systems, an occurrence of 3 simultaneous failures is considered rare, and the 
added failure rates from 4 or more simultaneous failures are very small and can be 
neglected. 
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All the reduction techniques are shown in Fig. 3.4. In Table 3.1, the effect 
of each reduction level on the number of nodes, sections, and states is listed.  
Study System
R1: Irrelevant Load 
Points









R2: Series and Parallel 
Sections
 
Fig. 3.4 Flow diagram for all reduction techniques 
Table 3.1 The effect of each reduction technique  
Reduction Technique Nodes Sections States 










R3 Irrelevant sections Yes Yes Yes 
R4 Sections of the irrelevant load points No Yes Yes 
T1 Maximum simultaneous failures No Yes Yes 
 
3.4 Prime Number Encoding Technique  
In the application of prime number encoding to the evaluation of 
distribution network reliability, prime numbers are used to encode the sections of 
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the power distribution network [47]. A prime number encoding-decoding 
technique is used to classify the state space as minimal tie sets, tie sets, minimal 
cut sets, and cut sets. This technique makes finding and categorizing the states of 
the system more flexible. The prime numbers corresponding to each line in the 14 
line system are shown in Table 3.2. The next step will be to assign an 
identification number (ID) to each possible line combination for all tie and cut 
sets. The IDs will be the product of the prime numbers for all lines in all the 
possible combinations. 
Table 3.2 Prime numbers encoding for a general 14 line system 
Line 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Prime Number 2 3 5 7 11 13 17 
Line 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Prime Number 19 23 29 31 37 41 43 
 
One limitation of this encoding system is that the large ID numbers can be 
as large as 10
17 
for only 14 lines in the combination. This is a large number and 
standardized software use could be problematic (e.g., on some computers and for 
some computational languages there is a lack of capability to store and perform 
precise operations large numbers. This is limited by both the software and the 
word length used). Dividing large numbers may result in rounded output, 
especially in the remainder. This imprecision can affect restoring the original line 
set and give incorrect results for the minimal cut sets. One way to avoid this 
encoding limitation is to modify the encoding technique so that one such modified 
encoding technique assigns the same prime sequence for each group of lines. For 
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the same 14 line system, lines 1 to 14 can be encoded as shown in Table 3.3. The 
ID for each line combination will now consist of two columns—one column for 
each set of lines (see Table 3.4).   
Table 3.3 Modified prime numbers encoding for a general 14 line system 
Line 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Prime Number 2 3 5 7 11 13 17 
Line 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Prime Number 2 3 5 7 11 13 17 
 
The indicated modified prime encoding will provide more accuracy and 
flexibility in the reliability calculations. The number of columns or the number of 
prime sets depends on the number of lines or components in the system. There is 
no apparent limitation to this technique. 
Table 3.4 Prime numbers encoding and IDs for a general 14 line system 
Possible Line Combinations Prime Numbers Encoding ID 





0 , 2 
: 
: 
[ 0 , 2 ] 
: 
1, 4 2 * 7 , 0 [ 14 , 0] 
: : : 
2, 5, 8 3 * 11 ,  2 [ 33 , 2 ] 
: : : 
1, 2, 3 …… ,14 2 * 3 … *17,   2* 3….. * 17 [ 510510 , 510510] 
 
One main advantage of using prime numbers to encode any possible 
combination or set is that the ID is unique for each set of lines. Each ID can be 
decoded easily to restore the line numbers by factorizing the ID and returning 
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each prime number to its corresponding component’s number. Fig. 3.5 shows the 
block diagram for the encoding-decoding method.  
Components 
1 – 2 – 3 – 5 – 7 
Prime codes





Fig. 3.5 Component encoding-decoding 
3.5 Petri Nets and Minimal Tie Sets  
3.5.1 Petri Nets 
Since 1962 [48], Petri nets have been widely used in system reliability 
evaluation, fault tree analysis, distributed databases, and other applications. In the 
area of reliability evaluation, Petri nets have been used to determine simple tie 
sets, identification of k-trees, and in fault tree analysis. A Petri net is a directed 
graph with two types of nodes: places (circles) and transitions (bars). These nodes 
are linked by sets of arcs, and there can be more than one connection between the 
places and transitions. Places may contain a number of tokens to reflect the 
dynamic behavior of the system. Figure 3.6 shows the basic components of Petri 
nets [48]. 
Place Transition Arc Token  
Fig. 3.6 Basic Petri net components 
The static structure of the system is represented by the Petri net graph, in 
which the connections between different parts and components are modeled by 
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places, arcs, and transitions. The dynamic behavior of the modeled system is 
demonstrated by executing a Petri net model by “firing” the transitions [48]. As 
shown in Fig. 3.7, each transition can be fired if and only if the arc connecting a 
node to a transition holds at least the same number of tokens as the weight of the 








Fig. 3.7 Petri net model (a) initial Petri net (b) after t1 is fired 
3.5.2 Using Petri Nets to Find Minimal Tie Sets 
To determine the MTS, it is necessary to find the transitions of the given 
graph by which a token at a destination node is reachable from a token at a source 
place. This can be done by solving the state space representation of Petri nets 
[50]: 
  ∑    (3.1) 
where    is the connection matrix of the Petri net (transition to place incident 
matrix),    = [aij], and aij = 1 if there is a connection (arc) between i,j, and aij = is 
equal to zero if there is no connection. Vector   is a column vector of the input-
output (change in marking), where mi = 1 for i = source or destination and mi = 0 
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otherwise; and ∑ is a column vector for the firing count and its element ∑i = 0 if 
the bus is not included in the path. 
A flow chart for using a Petri net to evaluate the MTS is shown in Fig. 3.8, 
and the following steps summarize this procedure [49]: 
1. Find the    matrix (connection matrix) and   matrix (input – output 
vector).  
2. Compare all the columns    with  . If any column is equal to , it is a 
success path of length one (L=1).  
3. Increment the value of L by one.  
4. Find all possible L combinations for   columns. 
5. Add L columns for each combination using mod-2 addition. If the addition 
equals , the indices corresponding to these columns represent a successful 
minimal path of length L.  
6. Repeat steps 3 - 5 until L equals N-1, where N is the total number of columns 
in   . 
3.6 Prime Number Classification Technique  
The unique factorization theorem and the encoded IDs for all MTSs are 
used to catch all TSs in the state space. Then, the remaining states can be 
classified as MCSs or CSs. 





n= All possible 
combinations of  



















Fig. 3.8 Flow chart for Petri nets - minimal tie set method 
To classify the states or the combinations of the system as MTSs or TSs, a 
master list (ML) is created with all possible combinations for all the lines in the 
system. After defining all the states in the ML, a flag and an ID are assigned to 
each state in the ML. The flag is used to identify each ID based on its status. In 
the first stage, the MTS flag is assigned the value +1. Then, a direct iterative 
method is used to identify the TSs using each MTS found in the first stage. The 
technique used to identify the TSs using prime number IDs is as follows in 
pseudocode:   
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            (
   
   
)    
                                       
                        
 
where ID2 is the MTS ID and ID1 is each remaining ID with an unassigned status 
flag (flag = 0). If the components of ID2 are a subset of the components of ID1, 
the remainder of their division will be equal to 0, in which case ID1 will be a TS 
with a flag equal to -1. The remaining IDs with unassigned flags will be CS or 
MCS; a similar concept can be used to separate them. Fig. 3.9 shows a flow chart 






























Fig. 3.9 Flow chart for the TS identification technique 
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To apply all these techniques explained in Sections 3.3–3.6, consider the 
system shown in Fig. 3.10. The two primary feeders and all the secondary feeders 
are assumed to be identical. In Fig. 3.10 (a), the lines are numbered based on their 
connections to the source; in Fig. 3.10(b), the lines are encoded using prime 
numbers in two groups, as shown in Table 3.4. To simplify the analysis, one load 









































LOAD(a) (b)  
Fig. 3.10 Encoded secondary grid network under study 
In Fig. 3.10, it is assumed that the maximum number of components that 
can form a cut set is 3. After applying all the reduction techniques, the number of 
states dropped from 16,384 to 4,096. This is due to the series combination for 
lines 3 and 5 and lines 12 and 14. The truncation technique reduces the states 
further from 4,096 to 299 states based on the predefined 3 maximum 
simultaneous failures in the system. Fig. 3.11 shows the system after combining 
the series components.  





































LOAD(a) (b)  
Fig. 3.11 Secondary grid network after applying all reduction methods 
The total number of states, minimal cut, and tie sets for different 
maximum failures are shown in Table 3.5. As a result of applying the proposed 
techniques to the circuit in Fig.3.11, the MCSs of the system are depicted in Table 
3.6.  
Table 3.5 MTS, TS, MCS, and CS for different maximum failures 
Maximum failures Total states MTS TS MCS CS 
1 15 0 15 0 0 
2 79 0 77 2 0 
3 299 0 273 6 20 
4 794 0 640 12 142 
5 1586 3 1040 19 524 
 
Table 3.6 MCSs IDs, prime codes, and components 
ID MCS Prime codes MCS Components 
[85085,2310] 5-7-11-13-17, 2-3-5-7-11 1-2 
[2805,2310] 3-5-11-17, 2-3-5-7-11 1-4-6 
[714,2310] 2-3-7-17, 2-3-5-7-11 3-5-6 
[6006,210] 2-3-7-11-13, 2-3-5-7 3-7-12 
[510510,22] 2-3-5-7-11-13-17, 2-11 9-10-11 
[510510,70] 2-3-5-7-11-13-17, 2-5-7 9-12 
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3.7 Using Markov Models to Calculate Load and System Reliability Indices 
After classifying all the states as tie or cut sets, the Markov transition and 
coefficient matrices (σ and Q matrices) are formed using the transition rates 
between all the states. The tie and cut sets are used to classify the states as up or 
down states. Then, the availability of each state is computed, as explained in 
Section 2.3.  
The next stage will be forming the truncated matrix S from the probability 
matrix P. Then, (2.27) is used to compute the fundamental matrix N, which is then 
used to calculate the MTTF for each up state.  
In the third stage, the down states are merged together to remove any 
mutual occurrence between them. Then, the frequency of the merged down state 
is computed using the modified transition matrix (with the merged state) and the 
availabilities found in stage 1. 
Subsequently, the availabilities, MTTF, and failure frequency are used to 
compute all the load point and system reliability indices. Fig. 3.12 shows the flow 
diagram that explains how to compute the availability, mean time to failure, and 
failure frequency for each load point using Markov model. Table. 3.7 details the 
main equations used to compute the load and system reliability indices.  
















































Fig. 3.12 Flow chart for computing A, MTTF, and f using Markov models 
Table 3.7 Equations used to compute the load and system reliability indices 
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Chapter 4 
RELIABILITY BOUNDS EVALUATION FOR POWER DISTRIBUTION 
SYSTEM 
4.1 Minimal Cut Set Method: A General Approach 
For networked distribution systems, there are two subsystems that can 
represent the connections of the original system. Each subsystem is comprised of 
series-parallel connections; the first set is the minimal tie set (MTS), and the other 
is the minimal cut set (MCS). The MTS and MCS are explained in Section 3.1. 




















Minimal Tie Sets Minimal Cut Sets  
Fig. 4.1 Simple illustration for minimal tie - cut sets 
To calculate the reliability of the distribution network using the MCS 
method, the reliability of each set is computed by calculating the failure 
probability of all components in parallel. Then, the reliability of the system can be 
found by evaluating the equivalent MCSs connected in series. The direct series 
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and parallel equivalent equations cannot be used to calculate the reliability of the 
system using the MCS. This is due to the possible correlation between any two 
sets, since components may be repeated and appear in more than one set. The only 
way to avoid this restriction is to solve the MCS subsystem using the basic union 
and intersection probability calculations to block the effect of the dependent cut 
sets [51, 52]. The U and AIF of the system will be:  
                   
  {             }  {            (     )}   
                        
(4.1) 
 
                       
    {                 }  {                (     )}   
                       
(4.2) 
where Ci is the ith minimal cut set (   ), and m is the total number of minimal 
cut sets. The solution using (4.1) and (4.2) will be complicated and time 
consuming. To overcome the complexity of using this method, particularly in 
large complex systems, an approximate calculation of the upper and lower bounds 
for the U and AIF can be applied. 
The successive addition for the odd and even terms in (4.1) and (4.2) will 
gradually converge the upper and lower bounds of the unavailability and average 
failure frequency [51, 52]. For highly reliable components, the first odd and even 
terms can give a small margin between the upper and lower bounds. This will 
simplify the computation and provide acceptable results with minimal errors.  
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The upper bounds for the U and AIF are:  
   ∑     
 
   
 (4.3) 
     ∑       
 
   
 (4.4) 
and the lower bounds are:   
   ∑      
 
   
∑        
 
   
 (4.5) 
     ∑        
 
   
∑          
 
   
 (4.6) 
To calculate the upper and lower bounds of the system for the A, AID, 
FD, and ENS, use [53]: 
                (4.7, 4.8) 
                        (4.9, 4.10) 
    
    
    
     
    
    
 (4.11, 4.12) 
                              (4.13, 4.14) 
The upper and lower bounds of SAIFI can be calculated by finding the 
interruption frequency of all buses, divided by the number of customers connected 
in the system: 
        
∑        
 
   
  
 (4.15) 
        
∑        
 
   
  
 (4.16) 
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A similar idea can be applied for SAIDI, which is simply the summation 
of the interruption duration of all buses, divided by the number of customers 
connected in the system: 
        
∑        
 
   
  
 (4.17) 
        
∑        
 
   
  
 (4.18) 
Other system indices include customer average interruption duration index 
(CAIDI), Average system availability index (ASAI), average system 
unavailability index (ASUI), and ENS: 
       
      
      
        
      
      
 (4.19, 4.20) 
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 (4.21, 4.22) 
                            (4.23, 4.24) 
     ∑          
 
   
      ∑          
 
   
 (4.25, 4.26) 
4.2 Roy Billinton Test System (RBTS) 
In this study, the Roy Billinton test system (RBTS) is used to evaluate the 
reliability under different scenarios. The RBTS has been referenced for many 
reliability studies and evaluation techniques in the literature. A description of the 
RBTS and system data can be found in [41, 54]. The advantage of the RBTS is 
the availability of the practical reliability data for all components. Another 
advantage is the manageable size of this system, which makes it easier to 
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perform hand calculations to verify any reliability model or technique used to 
evaluate the reliability indices.  
The RBTS has 5 loads busbars (Bus 2-Bus 6) with different connections 
and characteristics for each subsystem. The single line diagram for the RBTS 






















5 Load Buses (185 MW peak load):
Bus No. (Peak MW)
Bus 2 (20 MW) Bus 3 (85 MW)   
Bus 4 (40 MW)
Bus 5 (20 MW) Bus 6 (20 MW)
 
Fig. 4.2 Single line diagram for RBTS 
The following comments are related to the RBTS under study in this report:  
 All feeders and transformers are assumed to be equipped with 
interruption devices to isolate any sustained failure. It is assumed that 
all interruption devices in the system are 100% reliable (fuses, 
disconnects, and breakers) and capable of isolating the faulted segment 
instantaneously. The switching time is considered to be zero or less 
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than 5 minutes where the event is considered as momentary 
interruption based on the IEEE standard 1366 [55].  
 The normally open tie switches are also considered 100% reliable with 
zero switching time.  
 Transformers connected for residential, commercial, and governmental 
users are considered utility property. Therefore, the transformers are 
included in the single line diagrams and in the reliability evaluation. 
On the other hand, the small industrial customers are connected to the 
high voltage side, and the transformers in this case are customer 
property. These transformers are not shown in the single line diagram 
and not included in the calculation.  
 The main feeders in the system can be either overhead lines or 
underground cables.  
 It is assumed that adequate capacity is installed in the system for the 
normal operation and all failure scenarios. All the lines and 
components are within the capacity limits.  
 The initial state of the test systems is assumed to be in normal 
operation mode, where all the components and lines in the system 
work properly.  
 The average load given for each load point is the average load seen at 
each load point based on the average consumption over a year.  
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4.3 Using Prime Number Encoding and Petri Nets in Reliability Bounds          
Evaluation   
The general flow diagram for all proposed techniques used in the 
reliability bounds evaluation is shown in Fig. 4.3 [53]. After applying the prime 
number encoding and Petri nets techniques to classify all the states in the system, 
the classified MCSs are used to calculate the reliability bounds, which were 
explained in Section 4.1.  
Study System
Master List (ML)













MTS Flags = 1
Tie Sets (TS) Identification
(Iterative Method)
Update ML
TS Flags = -1




MCS Flags = 2






Fig. 4.3 Flow chart for evaluating the reliability bounds  
To apply all the prime number encoding and Petri nets techniques, 
consider the system shown in Fig. 4.4. The system under study is the 11 kV side 
of the Bus 2 of RBTS [54]. The reliability data for RBTS Bus 2 can be found in 
Appendix B. 
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Fig. 4.4 Single line diagram for RBTS Bus 2 
In Fig. 4.4, it is assumed that the maximum number of components that 
can form a cut set is 3. This may be a reasonable assumption, since in power 
distribution systems, the occurrence of 4 failures at the same time is considered to 
be rare, and the effect of 4 components in parallel in a state diagram is 
insignificant. If this assumption is relaxed, the complexity of the solution 
increases, but is still calculable by a similar procedure.  
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As a result of applying the algorithm to the circuit in Fig. 4.4, the total 
numbers of the MTSs and MCSs for all load points are shown in Fig. 4.5. The 
blocks that represent the sets for LP 1 are shown in Fig. 4.6, where each set is 
represented by a parallel connection of its components. 
 
Fig. 4.5 Total number of the MTS and MCS for RBTS Bus 2 
 
2Source













Fig. 4.6 Block diagram for the minimal cut sets for LP 1 – RBTS Bus 2 
The calculation of the upper and lower bounds of the load indices for LP 1 
is shown in Table 4.1. The difference between the upper and lower bounds for all 
the load indices is insignificant and can be ignored. The upper bound equations 
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the availability of the system components is very high. The upper and lower 
bounds for the system indices are also shown in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.1 Reliability load indices for LP 1 – RBTS Bus 2 
Load Index Upper Bound Lower Bound 
A 0.999635396 0.999635396 
U 0.000364604 0.000364604 
AIF (f/y) 0.054012479 0.054012473 
AID (h/y) 3.193933055 3.193933042 
FD (h/f) 59.13324941 59.13324293 
ENS (MWh/y) 1.708754184 1.708754177 
 
Table 4.2 Reliability system indices for RBTS Bus 2 
System Index Upper Bound Lower Bound 
SAIFI (f/c.y) 0.060950419 0.060950407 
SAIDI (h/c.y) 3.225517233 3.225517207 
CAIDI (h/y) 52.94270576 52.94269517 
ASAI  0.99963179 0.99963179 
ASUI  0.00036821 0.00036821 
ENS (MWh/y) 18.04666543 18.04666524 
 
In Fig. 4.7, the effect of higher component failures and repair rates is 
demonstrated. The failure rate used in this case is equal to 20 f/y for all 
components, and the time to repair is 20 h. As shown in Fig. 4.7 and Table 4.3, 
the difference between the upper and lower bounds is significant, and any 
approximation will introduce a considerable error for load and system indices.  
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Fig. 4.7 Upper and lower load indices bounds for RBTS Bus 2 (λ=20 f/y, 
MTTR=20 h) 
 
Table 4.3 Reliability system indices for RBTS Bus 2 (λ=20 f/y, MTTR=20 h) 
System Index Upper Bound Lower Bound 
SAIFI (f/c.y) 54.90934 50.21773 
SAIDI (h/c.y) 896.9959 865.788 
CAIDI (h/y) 17.86268 15.80304 
ASAI 0.901166 0.897603 
ASUI 0.102397 0.098834 
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Chapter 5 
RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT USING EMCS ALGORITHM 
5.1 Using the EMCS Algorithm to Evaluate the Reliability  
The reliability indices help the utilities evaluate their networks and 
improve these reliability indices for better service. The system and load point 
reliability indices are useful tools for assessing past and future reliability 
performance. They are also useful in predicting the severity of component failures 
in future operations of the power system. A reliability evaluation study quantifies 
reliability based on component reliability data and can be used to identify the 
problematic components in the system that can impact reliability. It can also help 
predict the reliability performance of the system after any expansion and quantify 
the impact of adding new components to the system. The number and locations of 
new components needed to improve reliability indices to certain limits can be 
identified and studied.  
To evaluate the reliability of the secondary grid network, the EMCS 
method is used as explained in Chapter 3. MATLAB was used to evaluate the 
distribution system reliability using EMCS algorithm. A sample MATLAB code 
for the EMCS algorithm can be found in Appendix C. The general flow diagram 
for evaluating the reliability of a grid network using the EMCS algorithm is 
shown in Fig. 5.1.  
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Reduction and Truncation Techniques
 
Fig. 5.1 Flow chart for EMCS algorithm 
5.2 RBTS Bus 4 Study System  
The system under study is the RBTS Bus 4 [54]. The single line diagram 
for the system is shown in Fig. 5.2. The number of components and customers in 
this system are shown in Table 5.1.  
Table 5.1 Number of components and customers for RBTS Bus 4 
 11 kV subsystem 33 kV subsystem Total 
Feeders 67 4 71 
Transformers 29 6 35 
Busbars 3 3 6 
Total number of components 99 13 112 
Main feeders 7 - 7 
Load points 38 - 38 
Customers 4779 - 4779 
 Fig. 5.2 Single line diagram for RBTS Bus 4
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The reliability data for RBTS Bus 4 can be found in Appendix B [54]. In 
this study, overhead lines are used to analyze the system, and underground cables 
are used as a possible approach to improve the reliability of the system. The 11 
kV and 33 kV subsystems are both included in this study. 
The faulted 11/0.415 kV transformers are repaired and returned to service 
with listed repair rate and time. Replacing the transformer after failure is 
considered an optional technique to reduce the outage time and improve the 
outage duration experienced by the customer (whether they are residential, 
commercial, or small industrial users). The 33/11 kV transformers are only 
replaced when they fail.   
5.3 RBTS Bus 4 Reliability Analysis 
The reliability study performed on the RBTS Bus 4 and different load and 
system indices were calculated. The study takes into account the failures on the 11 
kV and 33 kV feeders and transformers. All interruption devices and tie switches 
are considered 100% reliable and to operate successfully when they are needed.  
The first stage of analysis applies the reduction techniques explained in 
Section 3.3. These techniques will lessen the number of components and states of 
the system. Reducing the number of states will reduce the size of all reliability 
matrices and expedite the computation process. As shown in Fig. 5.3 for LP 1, the 
number of nodes for the base case system is 98 nodes. In this case, there is no 
reduction method applied to the system. After applying all the reduction methods 
(R1-R4), the number of nodes decreases from 98 to only 9 nodes. The reduction 
levels (R2-R4) are repeated twice for the maximum reduction outcome.  
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Fig. 5.3 Number of nodes after each reduction level for LP 1 – RBTS Bus 4 
The number of components for LP 1 is shown in Fig. 5.4. The components 
and states are not affected by the first reduction method (R1) since only irrelevant 
load nodes are removed in this stage. In the second reduction method (R2), the 
components and states are reduced after combining all the series and parallel 
components. In the third method (R3), the components and states are also 
removed if they do not share any common node with all components of the 
possible input-output routes. The last reduction stage (R4) removes the 
components of the irrelevant loads deleted in R1. The number of components at 
the end of reduction process reduced from 106 components to only 13 equivalent 
components. 
After the reduction level 4, the truncation level reduces the number of 
states according to the specified number of simultaneous failures in the system. 
The number is usually two or three failures, depending on the system and the 
failure reliability data of its components. For this system, the maximum number 
98 
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of failures is three. The number of states reduced after applying all reduction 
techniques from 8.11×10
31
 to only 378 states, which is shown for LP 1 in Fig. 5.5. 
 
Fig. 5.4 Number of components after each reduction level for LP 1 – RBTS Bus 4 
 
Fig. 5.5 Number of states after each reduction level for LP 1 – RBTS Bus 4 
After reducing the number of components and states of the system, Petri 
nets and prime number encoding were used to create the master list and determine 
the minimal tie, tie, minimal cut, and cut sets. Table 5.2 shows the new 
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Table 5.2 Equivalent sections and their original sections for LP 1 – RBTS Bus 4 
Equivalent section Original sections 
1 1 
2 2, 78 
3 3, 5, 7, 10, 56, 58, 60, 63, 65 
4 13, 15, 17 
5 19, 21, 23, 26, 28, 31, 33, 36, 39, 41 
6 44, 46, 48 
7 50, 52, 54 
8 68, 69 
9 70 
10 71 
11 72, 73 
12 74, 75 
13 76, 77 
Deleted sections 
4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 25, 27, 29, 
30, 32, 34, 35, 37, 38, 40, 42, 43, 45, 47, 49, 51, 
53, 55, 57, 59, 61, 62, 64, 66, 67, 79-106 
 
Moreover, all states are encoded using the prime number encoding 
technique explained in Section 3.4. Because the reduced model has only 13 
sections, with the maximum number of section in each group assumed to be 5, 
each ID for each state will consist of three groups, as shown in Table. 5.3. The 
combination in Table 5.4 represents the system when it is normally operating with 
no sections in fault. The prime numbers used for each group are also listed, and 
the ID is the multiplication of all the prime numbers in each group. The next step 
is finding the tie and cut sets using Petri net and prime number encoding 
techniques. The different numbers of minimal tie sets, tie sets, minimal cut sets, 
and cut sets are listed in Table 5.6 for each maximum number of failures. 
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Table 5.3 States prime encoding for LP 1 – RBTS Bus 4 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
Section 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Prime number 2 3 5 7 11 2 3 5 7 11 2 3 5 
ID 2310 2310 30 
 
Table 5.4 Different sets count for each maximum failures for LP 1 – RBTS Bus 4 
Max. failures MTS TS MCS CS Total states 
1 0 13 1 0 14 
2 0 78 2 12 92 
3 0 285 5 88 378 
4 0 702 12 379 1093 
5 3 1222 21 1134 2380 
 
In Tables 5.5 and 5.6, all the minimal tie and minimal cut sets are listed 
for load 1. Although all the minimal tie sets are computed, they are not presented 
in the state space. This is because the maximum number of failures allowed is 3, 
which then removed the minimal tie sets states from the state space. At the end of 
the reduction process, the minimal tie sets IDs will not be able to locate their 
states in the state space. 
After classifying all the states as tie or cut sets, the availability, MTTF, 
and failure frequency can be found using the Markov models explained in Section 
3.7. The transition matrices used for various maximum numbers of failures are 
shown in Fig. 5.6. The size and the number of nonzero elements in the transition 
matrix can affect the capability and computation speed of evaluating the 
reliability of using Markov models. After computing availability, MTTF, and 
failure frequency using Markov models, the load point and system reliability 
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indices can be calculated. All the load point reliability indices are listed in Table 
5.7.   
 
Table 5.5 Minimal tie sets for LP 1 – RBTS Bus 4 
Tie set level ID Sections 
3 6 1 2 1 2 - - - - - - - - 11 - - 
4 15 5 5 - 2 3 - - - - 8 - - - - 13 
5 
66 7 3 1 2 - - 5 - - - 9 - - 12 - 
105 3 2 - 2 3 4 - - 7 - - - 11 - - 
15 77 5 - 2 3 - - - - - 9 10 - - 13 
6 
42 14 3 1 2 - 4 - 6 - - 9 - - 12 - 
42 15 5 1 2 - 4 - - 7 8 - - - - 13 
66 55 3 1 2 - - 5 - - 8 - 10 - 12 - 
165 6 2 - 2 3 - 5 6 7 - - - 11 - - 
15 42 3 - 2 3 - - 6 7 - 9 - - 12 - 
7 
42 110 3 1 2 - 4 - 6 - 8 - 10 - 12 - 
42 231 5 1 2 - 4 - - 7 - 9 10 - - 13 
66 30 5 1 2 - - 5 6 7 8 - - - - 13 
1155 21 3 - 2 3 4 5 - 7 - 9 - - 12 - 
165 11 30 - 2 3 - 5 - - - - 10 11 12 13 
15 330 3 - 2 3 - - 6 7 8 - 10 - 12 - 
8 
66 462 5 1 2 - - 5 6 7 - 9 10 - - 13 
1155 165 3 - 2 3 4 5 - 7 8 - 10 - 12 - 
105 22 30 - 2 3 4 - 6 - - - 10 11 12 13 
 
 
Table 5.6 Minimal cut sets for LP 1 – RBTS Bus 4 
Cut set level ID Sections 
1 770 2310 30 - 2 - - - - - - - - - - - 
2 231 2310 30 1 - 3 - - - - - - - - - - 
3 
1155 770 6 1 - - - - - 7 - - - - - 13 
2310 66 15 - - - - - - - 8 9 - 11 - - 
2310 2310 1 - - - - - - - - - - 11 12 13 
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Fig. 5.6 Transition matrix for various maximum failures for LP 1 – RBTS Bus 4 




Max. number of failures = 5 
Number of nonzero elements = 20644 
 
Max. number of failures = 4 
Number of nonzero elements = 7774 
 
  
Max. number of failures = 3 
Number of nonzero elements = 2054 
 
Max. number of failures = 2 
Number of nonzero elements = 338 
 










































  73 














1 0.999635 0.000365 18.5076 0.0540 3.1940 59.1431 1.7407 
2 0.999630 0.000370 15.6737 0.0638 3.2427 50.8511 1.7673 
3 0.999635 0.000365 18.4972 0.0540 3.1940 59.1091 1.7408 
4 0.999628 0.000372 14.9101 0.0670 3.2590 48.6148 1.7762 
5 0.999630 0.000370 15.6694 0.0638 3.2428 50.8361 1.6214 
6 0.999628 0.000372 14.9099 0.0670 3.2590 48.6138 1.3525 
7 0.999630 0.000370 15.6693 0.0638 3.2428 50.8350 1.3458 
8 0.999978 0.000022 25.6368 0.0390 0.1950 4.9997 0.1950 
9 0.999972 0.000028 20.5108 0.0488 0.2438 4.9998 0.3656 
10 0.999970 0.000030 19.2310 0.0520 0.2600 5.0000 0.2600 
11 0.999628 0.000372 14.9178 0.0670 3.2589 48.6416 1.7761 
12 0.999630 0.000370 15.6745 0.0638 3.2427 50.8540 1.7673 
13 0.999630 0.000370 15.6712 0.0638 3.2428 50.8428 1.7673 
14 0.999635 0.000365 18.4979 0.0540 3.1940 59.1114 1.5970 
15 0.999630 0.000370 15.6694 0.0638 3.2428 50.8362 1.6214 
16 0.999635 0.000365 18.4947 0.0540 3.1941 59.0997 1.3255 
17 0.999630 0.000370 15.6690 0.0638 3.2428 50.8343 1.3458 
18 0.999630 0.000370 15.6799 0.0638 3.2427 50.8645 1.7673 
19 0.999635 0.000365 18.5028 0.0540 3.1940 59.1214 1.7407 
20 0.999630 0.000370 15.6749 0.0638 3.2427 50.8500 1.7673 
21 0.999630 0.000370 15.6715 0.0638 3.2428 50.8402 1.7673 
22 0.999635 0.000365 18.4980 0.0540 3.1940 59.1079 1.5970 
23 0.999630 0.000370 15.6695 0.0638 3.2428 50.8351 1.6214 
24 0.999630 0.000370 15.6690 0.0638 3.2428 50.8343 1.3458 
25 0.999635 0.000365 18.4947 0.0540 3.1941 59.0997 1.3255 
26 0.999972 0.000028 20.5108 0.0488 0.2438 4.9997 0.2438 
27 0.999970 0.000030 19.2291 0.0520 0.2600 4.9998 0.2600 
28 0.999978 0.000022 25.6412 0.0390 0.1950 5.0000 0.1950 
29 0.999978 0.000022 25.6374 0.0390 0.1950 4.9996 0.1950 
30 0.999972 0.000028 20.5105 0.0488 0.2438 4.9997 0.2438 
31 0.999978 0.000022 25.6412 0.0390 0.1950 5.0000 0.2925 
32 0.999628 0.000372 14.9200 0.0670 3.2589 48.6417 1.7761 
33 0.999628 0.000372 14.9164 0.0670 3.2590 48.6314 1.7761 
34 0.999635 0.000365 18.4997 0.0540 3.1940 59.1127 1.7407 
35 0.999628 0.000372 14.9131 0.0670 3.2590 48.6218 1.7762 
36 0.999635 0.000365 18.4965 0.0540 3.1941 59.1038 1.5970 
37 0.999628 0.000372 14.9099 0.0670 3.2590 48.6138 1.6295 
38 0.999635 0.000365 18.4951 0.0540 3.1941 59.1006 1.3255 
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In Fig. 5.7, the availability and unavailability for all load points in the 
system are shown. The availability for LP 8–LP 10 and LP 26–LP 31 are higher 
due to the absence of transformers in these loads connections. The transformers at 
these loads are considered customer property and will not be included in the 
reliability evaluation. 
 
Fig. 5.7 Availability and unavailability for all load points – RBTS Bus 4 
The AID and FD are shown in Fig. 5.8. The reduction in duration value at 
loads 8–10 and 26–31 is due to the absence of transformers. The customers at 
these load points are small industrial plants connected directly to the 11 kV side.  
After computing the load points’ reliability indices, the system reliability 
indices are calculated. The system reliability indices are shown in Table 5.8.  
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Fig. 5.8 AID and FD for all load points – RBTS Bus 4 
Table 5.9 shows the system reliability calculation with different values of 
maximum simultaneous failures. In Table 5.2, the number of states and the 
percentage of change are also shown for each case.   
Table 5.9 System indices and percentage of change for each maximum failure – 
RBTS Bus 4 








Index 0.0614 3.2207 52.4532 
Percentage of change (%) - - - 
2 92 
Index 0.062 3.226 52.414 
Percentage of change (%) 0.241 0.166 0.074 
3 378 
Index 0.061 3.226 52.414 
Percentage of change (%) 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 
4 1093 
Index 0.061 3.2261 52.414 
Percentage of change (%) 0 0 0 
5 2380 
Index 0.061 3.226 52.414 
Percentage of change (%) 0 0 0 
 
After reducing the number components and states, the prime number 
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encoding technique was used to create the master list and to categorize the tie 
sets, cut, and minimal cut sets. The load points and system reliability indices 
could then be computed using the Markov models explained in Chapter 2. The 
computation time for each maximum number of simultaneous failures is shown in 
Figs. 5.9. The computation time for applying all reduction and truncation 
techniques and creating the master list for all states is nearly the same for all 
maximum failures. The time to find the MCS and CS as well as evaluate the 
reliability indices using Markov models increases as the number of maximum 
failures increases.   
 
Fig. 5.9 Computation time in seconds for each maximum number of failures – 
RBTS Bus 4 
The reliability indices also help the utilities evaluate their networks and 
improve these reliability indices for providing better service. These indices can be 
improved by reducing the main influencing factors [18] including: 
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- Outage frequency  
- Number of customers interrupted. 
The system reliability indices are calculated to measure the effect the 
improvement of each component would have on these indices. In Fig. 5.10, the 
SAIDI is computed for each component with a 50% reduction in repair time. The 
percentage of change in SAIDI is also shown for each component. The most 
significant impact to SAIDI occurs when the repair time for the transformers 
decreased. The repair time can be improved by reducing the response time of the 
maintenance crew to repair the transformers by managing the location of the 
crews, the spare parts inventory, and travel time to the faulted site. 
 
Fig. 5.10 SAIDI for repair time improvement by 50% – RBTS Bus 4 
The effect of improving each component failure rate is demonstrated in 
Fig. 5.11. The SAIFI is improved even more when the lines connected to the 
high-density load points are improved. This will decrease the average failures 





















































































Percentage of Change SAIDI (Base Case) SAIDI (50% Time to Repair )
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duration due to the increase in MTTF at each load point. The lines can be 
improved by enhancing the component’s quality and reducing failure rate. This 
can be achieved by monitoring and increasing the preventive maintenance and 
replacing the components when they reach their expected lifetime. Additionally, it 
may also be helpful to isolate the overhead lines to protect them from tree or 
animal contact. 
 
Fig. 5.11 SAIFI for failure rate improvement by 50% – RBTS Bus 4 
To study the complete system change with the change in each 
component’s repair time, the reliability index (RI) is proposed where 4 different 
system indices are combined and weighted to form this RI:  
                                        (5.1) 
∑    
 




















































































Percentage of Change SAIFI (Base Case) SAIFI (50% Time to Repair )
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where wi is the weight for each i index and n is the number of system indices 
included in the RI. The SAIFIpu, SAIDIpu, ASUIpu, and ENSpu are the system 
indices per unit. The weights for all indices used in RI are equal to 0.25.  
The RI is shown in Fig. 5.12. Based on the system indices and weights 
used in this index, the greatest improvement occurs when the failure rate of the 
transformers connected to the higher customer density load points are improved. 
 
Fig. 5.12 RI for failure rate improvement by 50% – RBTS Bus 4 
Four different cases are demonstrated in Table 5.10 to study the effect of 
replacing the overhead lines with underground cables along with the effect of 
replacing the 11/0.415 kV transformers during their failures. Underground cables 
have a smaller failure rate but longer repair time. Replacing the transformer 
during the fault instead of repairing it will lessen the outage time and will not 
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Table 5.10 Different cases for the main feeders and transformers – RBTS Bus 4 
 11 kV Feeders 11/0.415 kV Transformers 













Case 1 Overhead lines 0.065 5 Repair 0.015 200 








0.04 30 Replace 0.015 10 
  
The availability for different cases in Table 5.10 is shown in Fig. 5.13. 
Replacing transformers decreases outage duration at each load point, which can 
lead to better availability. The availability for Case 2 is better than for Case 4 
because the overhead lines require less repair time than underground cables do.   
 
Fig. 5.13 Availability for different cases in Table 5.10 – RBTS Bus 4 
Repairing or replacing the transformers has no effect on the MTTF and 
will only change the repair time. The failure rate for the transformers will remain 



















Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
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the underground cables, this can lead (as shown in Fig. 5.14) to a lower failure 
frequency. 
 
Fig. 5.14 AIF for different cases in Table 5.10 – RBTS Bus 4 
Replacing any transformer will take less time than repairing it, and this 
will improve the AID in Cases 2 and 4, as shown in Fig. 5.15. This is also the 
reason for the improvement in ENS shown in Fig. 5.16. LP 8–LP 10 and LP 26–
LP 31 are not affected by the transformer restoration method because there are no 
transformers included in the reliability evaluation at these load points. 
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Fig. 5.16 ENS for different cases in Table 5.10 – RBTS Bus 4 
In Table 5.11 and Fig. 5.17, the system reliability indices are calculated 
for all Cases. It is shown that SAIDI, CAIDI, and ENS are improved when the 
transformers are replaced during the outages. The SAIFI is improved when the 
underground cables are used in the system because they have a smaller failure 
rate. 





























Case 1 0.06155 3.22613 52.41409 0.99963 0.00037 49.34924 
Case 2 0.06157 0.38259 6.21387 0.99996 0.00004 7.81227 
Case 3 0.04371 3.85404 88.17209 0.99956 0.00044 64.50936 
Case 4 0.04372 1.01071 23.11531 0.99988 0.00012 22.97536 
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Chapter 6 
DISTRIBUTED RESOURCES RELIABILITY INTEGRATION 
6.1 Distributed Resources Applications in Distribution Systems  
DG is defined as a small scale generation unit that is installed in the 
distribution system and typically connected at substations, on distribution feeders, 
or at the customer load level [56–58]. DG differs fundamentally from the 
traditional model of central generation as it can be located near end-users within 
an industrial area, inside a building, or in a community. Different types of DGs 
have been developed due to the increasing interest in the DG in recent years [59].  
DG units vary in size, fuel type, and efficiency, and they can be associated 
with two technologies, conventional energy technology and renewable energy 
technology. Technologies that utilize conventional energy resources include 
reciprocating engines, combustion turbines, micro-turbines, and fuel cells. 
Conversely, renewable energy resources are based on different forms of natural 
resources such as heat and light from the sun, the force of the wind, and the 
combustion value of organic matter [59–62]. A few examples of renewable DGs 
include photovoltaic cells, wind turbines, and biomass. The most promising 
renewable energies in the United States are wind and solar. The advantages and 
disadvantages of wind energy and photovoltaic are listed in Table 6.1.  
The main difference between the renewable and conventional resources is 
that the output of the renewable resources depends on variable inputs such as 
wind or solar energy. The power produced from renewable resources may 
fluctuate more, making it difficult forecast. In the case in which a DG is 
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connected to the local load to supply the load during interruptions, the demand 
and supply may not match, especially if the DG is renewable. In this case, the DG 
is either disconnected due to the activation of the frequency or voltage protection 
devices or the system will shed some loads and only supply critical loads. The 
emphasis of this research is the design phase and not the operational aspects of the 
distribution system. If the DG is incapable of supplying the full load demand, the 
DG will be disconnected from the local load. 
Table 6.1 Advantages and disadvantages for several renewable energies 
 Advantages Disadvantages 
Wind Energy 
 Short time to design and 
install 
 Low emission 
 Different modular size 
 Wind is highly variable 
 Limited resource sites 
 Audible and visual noise 
 Low availability during high 
demand periods 
Photovoltaic 
 Flexible in term of size and 
site 
 Simple operation 
 No moving parts and noise 
 Low maintenance 
 Short time for design and 
installation 
 No emissions 
 High capital cost 
 Large area required 
 Low efficiency 
 Low availability during high 
demand periods 
 Low capacity factor 
 
There are many potential applications for DG technologies. They can be 
classified as backup DGs or base load DGs. The DG can be used as a backup 
generator to replace the normal source when it fails to supply the load, thereby 
allowing the customer’s facility to continue to operate satisfactorily during the 
power outages. Most backup generators are diesel engines because of their low 
cost, fuel availability, and quick start time.  
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A backup DG is connected to the local load, and a manual or automatic 
switch is installed on the feeder side of the DG local load. During faults on the 
main feeder or its laterals, the circuit breaker on the substation side will trip to 
clear the fault, causing the whole feeder to be interrupted. Then, the DG switch 
can be closed and the DG unit can start supplying its local load.  
A base load DG is used by some customers to provide a portion or all of 
their electricity needs in parallel with the electric power system. It can also be 
used as an independent standalone source of power. The technologies used for 
these applications include renewable DGs such as wind, photovoltaic, fuel cells, 
and combined heat and power (CHP).  
6.2 Reliability Evaluation of Distribution System Including DG 
The main direct contribution of DG to reliability is on the customer side 
rather than on the utility or system side. The base level of reliability is always 
provided by the utility, and the DG’s role is to boost the level of reliability by 
supplying the local load during interruptions (assuming that the DG is properly 
sized to serve at least the critical loads). The duration of interruptions at the load 
bus are expected to be fewer when a standby DG is connected. Different factors 
should be considered when evaluating the reliability impact of the DG on the 
local load, such as fuel availability, power output, unit’s failure rate, repair time, 
and starting time. Many papers have discussed the technologies of DG units and 
their economical, environmental, and operational benefits [63–66].  
The presence of the DG in the distribution system may improve system 
reliability as a result of supplying loads in islanded operation. The islanded 
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operation implies that the load is disconnected from the substation and supplied 
from the DG until the utility restores the power from the main supply. The DG 
may not be able to supply the demand completely during the islanded mode. This 
is due to the availability and the capacity of the DG, especially when it depends 
on renewable resources. The DG also requires protection at the point of common 
coupling (PCC) between the utility grid and the DG facility to prevent any 
unintentional islanding. Generally, the DG cannot be islanded during interruptions 
with the external loads to the DG facility. This creates quality and safety problems 
to the utility in the maintenance and restoration processes. In most of the cases, 
load shedding is required in the local facility and only the critical loads are 
restored using the DG.  
Analyzing the reliability of future distribution systems, including the DG, 
is different than analyzing the generation and transmission systems with large 
scale central units. The main difference is in the interaction between the 
generation units, the lines and components network, and the load points. In the 
future distribution system, higher penetration of the DG will be connected to the 
local load or at different points of the main feeder. The DG has a smaller capacity 
to load ratio than do the central generation units. This ratio can limit the 
availability of the DG to supply the demand during the interruptions since the 
probability of the load demand to be greater than the DG power output is high.  
As shown in Fig. 6.1, during normal operation, the load is connected to the 
utility supply via the components and the feeders in the distribution network. If 
the distribution system connection fails to supply power to the load, the load is 
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supplied from the DG in an islanded operation. If the DG is a conventional 
backup unit, the DG is operated and connected to the load only during 
emergencies. If the DG unit is a renewable base load unit, it is continuously 
operated in parallel with the utility supply. But it has to be disconnected and 
















Fig. 6.1 Distribution connection system and DG system reliability models 
The networked distribution system reliability analysis was covered in 
Chapters 3-5. The DG modeling, DG system adequacy analysis, and integrating 
the reliability of the DGs in future distribution systems will be covered in this 
chapter. The integration of the DG in the reliability evaluation of future 
distribution systems consists of three main phases: DG unit reliability modeling, 
DG islanded system adequacy assessment, and DG islanded system reliability 
integration. These three phases are shown in Fig. 6.2 and will be explained in 
Sections 6.3–6.5.  
DG Islanded System 
Reliability Integration





Fig. 6.2 The integration of the DG in the reliability evaluation  
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The reliability model of the DG unit is a logical and mathematical 
representation of the impact of different failure modes of the DG and fuel supply 
availability on the DG power output. The difference between the DG model of 
conventional and renewable units, from the reliability point of view, is that 
conventional units generate the rated power if they are operational, On the other 
hand, the output power of the renewable units is related to the primary energy 
source such as wind speed or solar radiation intensity, even if the unit is in a 
working state. In the DG islanded system, the DG may not be able to supply the 
local load due to the insufficiency of the generated power to match the demand or 
internal failure in the unit.  
 To integrate the DG islanded system’s reliability into the distribution 
system reliability model, all the components (e.g., switches or protection devices) 
or failure modes that are related to the operation of the DG during interruptions 
should be incorporated into the DG reliability model. Then, a complete reliability 
model is proposed to evaluate the reliability of the distribution system including 
DG, compare different designs and different DG technologies from the reliability 
point of view, and optimize the size, number, and location of the DG units in the 
system. 
6.3 DG Unit Reliability Modeling  
In general, the DG unit reliability model consists of two main models: the 
fuel supply and the mechanical models. The fuel supply model represents the 
availability of the fuel supply to the unit during the study period. The mechanical 
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model represents the ability of the unit to operate successfully when it is needed 
without any failures.      
6.3.1 Reliability Model for Conventional DG 
In this research, the conventional DG unit is used as a backup generator 
that runs only during outages to supply the load and boost its reliability. The total 
operation cost of the DG is less than the expected outage cost of the load, but 
most likely higher than the main supply electricity price.  
The fuel supply for the conventional generators (gas, diesel) is non-
intermittent and assumed to be 100 % reliable. The mechanical model can be 
demonstrated by the two states model (up and down), where the up state 
represents the normal operation of the DG unit and the down state represents the 
failure of the unit to operate successfully. The conventional DG is assumed to 
have either full or zero capacity output. Fig. 6.3 shows the reliability model for 










Fig. 6.3 Conventional DG reliability model 
As shown in Fig. 6.4, the transition from the up state to the down state is 
known as the mechanical failure rate (  ), and the transition from the down state 
to the up state is the mechanical repair rate (   . The transition from one state to 
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another is assumed to be exponentially distributed and the availability and 
unavailability of the DG conventional unit are given by: 
    
  
     
 
     
           
 (6.1) 
    
  
     
 
     
           
 (6.2) 
The unit unavailability is also known as forced outage rate (FOR). Based 
on this model, the DG is available with power output (PDG) equal to its nominal 
power output only when there is no failure in the mechanical structure of the DG. 
The power output probability for the conventional DG is shown in Table 6.2, 





Fig. 6.4 Conventional DG mechanical model 
 
Table 6.2 CPT for conventional DG unit 
State Power Output Probability 
1 Up         
0 Down 0       
 
6.3.2 Reliability Model for Renewable DG 
The renewable DG is a time varying output source in which the output 
changes as the source availability changes. Because the primary energy source for 
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the renewable DG is intermittent, the power output characteristics of the wind and 
solar units are quite different from conventional units. The power output of these 
units depends on the stochastic nature and chronological variability of the natural 
primary source on top of the mechanical availability of the DG unit. 
The solar and wind energy units are used as base load units and operated 
during the normal system operation to lower the electricity price. The cost of 
running these units is less than the price of electricity. These units can also be 
used as backup units if the DG power output is adequate enough to supply the 
load during the time of the outage. The renewable DG power and the load do not 
follow the same trend, and the emergency power demand is likely to be higher 
than the DG power output. In this case, the DG units would be disconnected from 
the islanded system. 
In general, wind and solar unit modeling depends on the available 
historical data for each site. The historical wind speed for each site is used to 
predict the hourly data using a time series model such as auto-regressive and 
moving average model (ARMA) [67, 68]. The power output for each unit can be 
calculated based on the wind speed (or solar radiation) and by using the 
manufacturer’s specifications and parameters such as cut-in wind speed, cut-out 
wind speed, rated wind speed, and rated power output of the wind turbine [69]. 
Likewise, photovoltaic (PV) power output is related to the locational insolation, 
and the temperature of the PV cells. The mechanical model of the renewable DG 
is similar to the conventional DG’s mechanical model of the two states. The 
availability and unavailability of the mechanical unit are given in (6.1) and (6.2). 
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The objective of this research is not to evaluate the site’s reliability but to 
study the influence of the DGs on the reliability study. The power output of actual 
wind and solar units is used in this research to study the impact of these units on 
the load and system reliability performance. The primary energy source (solar or 
wind) is intermittent, and Figs. 6.5 and 6.6 show the typical daily power output of 
the wind and solar units. Fig. 6.5 shows the average summer and winter PV power 
output for a site in Florida [70], and Fig. 6.6 shows the wind power output for 
different months of the year and the average output for a site in California [71]. 
The PV power output is more predictable than the wind power output since the 
wind speed is highly intermittent.  
To model the renewable DG unit for the adequacy assessment, the annual 
per unit power output data for the renewable DG unit is used in the evaluation 
process. The first step is to arrange the per unit hourly DG power output in 
descending order, as shown in Fig. 6.7.  
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Fig. 6.6 Wind power output for different months in the year 
 
Fig. 6.7 Annual power output (in per unit) in descending order for the solar DG 
All the hourly power outputs are classified based on the predefined 
number of segments (n). The total level count will be n+1, as shown in Fig. 6.8, 

































































  95 
 
Fig. 6.8 Power output segments for the solar DG 
The power output probability (or capacity probability) of the renewable 
DG units is related to the availability of the unit and the availability of the 
primary source, as shown in Table 6.3 (CPT). The DG power output will be zero 
if the primary energy source is completely absent or if the mechanical part of the 
unit is down [25]. The probability of each power output segment is calculated by 
dividing the annual time of each segment by the total annual hours (8760 h). The 
process of calculating the capacity probability for the renewable DG is briefly 
described as follows:  
1- Arrange the hourly wind or solar power output curve in descending order. 
2- Define the power output levels as segments of the rated power.  
3- For each segment, measure the total time that the power output falls within 
the segment.  
4- Divide the total time of each segment by the total number of hours in one 
year to calculate the probability of each segment.  
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5- Using the probability of each segment and the mechanical availability of 
the unit, calculate the capacity probability for each level. 
Table 6.3 explains how the probability of each power segment is 
calculated. Fig. 6.9 shows the probability of each segment of the solar unit shown 
in Fig. 6.8, assuming that the unit is operating successfully. The capacity outage 
table (COT) can be created by using the probability of each level in the CPT. The 
COT shows outage capacity levels and the probability of their existence. For 
multiple units, the recursive algorithm is used to construct the COT by calculating 
the cumulative probability for all units in the system [41].  
Table 6.3 CPT for renewable DG unit 
States Power Output Capacity Outage Probability 
0 Down 0 100%    
  
 
     
1 Up (Derated)         (  
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  97 
6.4 Adequacy Assessment of the DG Islanded System 
6.4.1 Load Modeling  
The load model is usually represented by either the daily peak load 
variation curve (DPLVC) or the load duration curve (LDC). The DPLVC is 
constructed by arranging the peak load data in descending order, and the LDC is 
formed by arranging the hourly load data in descending order. The LDC is more 
realistic and is used in this research to include any hourly and seasonal variation 
in the demand.  
The chronological load models for different customer sectors used in this 
research are described and illustrated in [72, 73]. This load model simulates the 
hourly load behavior for seven different load sectors based on the type of the 
customer, the time of day, the day of the week, and the week of the year. The per 
unit hourly load can be determined using the following equation [74]:  
               (6.3) 
where    is the percentage of weekly load in terms of the annual peak load,    is 
the percentage of the daily load in terms of the weekly peak load, and    is the 
percentage of the hourly load in terms of the daily peak. All the parameters are 
given in Appendix D. 
In this research, residential, commercial, and industrial sectors were 
studied. Their daily load profiles for 24 hours and the weekly profiles are shown 
in Fig. 6.10 and 6.11, respectively.  
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Fig. 6.10 Daily load profiles for the residential, commercial, and industrial 
customers 
 
Fig. 6.11 Weekly load profiles for the residential, commercial, and industrial 
customers 
The annual load duration curve can be developed using (6.3). As an 
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demand probability table (DPT) of the load can be calculated in a similar fashion 
to how the CPT for renewable DGs was calculated.  
 
Fig. 6.12 Annual load curve for the residential customer 
6.4.2 DG Islanded System Adequacy Assessment 
The adequacy of the DG is commonly evaluated by convolving the time 
varying power output of the DG with the load duration curve to calculate the 
probability that the DG will supply the load demand. This adequacy analysis can 
be used to study the impact of the DG on the load and system reliability 
improvement during interruptions.  
The reduction on reliability indices is related to the islanded probability, 
frequency, and duration as seen by each load. During interruptions, if the total DG 
available capacity is greater than the load demand, the DG will supply the load. If 
the load is greater than the generated power, the DG will be disconnected or the 

























  100 
power output for different DG units and the annual per unit load demand for 
different customer sectors are shown in Figs. 6.13 and 6.14, respectively.   
 
Fig. 6.13 Annual per unit power output for different DG technologies 
 
Fig. 6.14 Annual per unit load demand for different customers sectors 
The most common indices used for adequacy assessment are: the loss of 
load expectation (LOLE), and the loss of load probability (LOLP). The LOLE is 













































  101 
insufficient to supply the demand. If the time used in calculating LOLE is per 
unit, this index is called LOLP.  
The LOLP and LOLE for conventional and renewable DG are given by:  
                          
     ∑  ∑  
 
   
 
   
       (6.4) 
                    (6.5) 
where n and m are the total number of levels in DPT and CPT, respectively,      is 
the probability of the load level i, Cj is the DG capacity of the level j, and 
         is the probability that the capacity state j is less than load level i.  
The adequacy indices are calculated by convolving the CPT of the DG 
with the DPT. Each power output or load segment is represented by the mean of 
all the data points in the segment. For each DG capacity level, the percentage of 
time for which the average demand is higher than the average generated power is 
used to calculate the LOLP.  
  The following steps summarize the procedure for evaluating the adequacy 
of the DG in supplying the load demand: 
1- For both the DG and the load under study, the CPT and DPT are generated 
and the mean is computed for each segment to be used in the adequacy 
assessment.  
2- For each DG power output segment in the CPT, the DPT is used to find 
the total time (or probability) for which the average load demand exceeds 
the average generated power for each segment.  
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3- The probability of each DG power output level is multiplied by the total 
time (or probability) found in step 2.  
4- The cumulative sum of all the products in step 3 yields the LOLE (or 
LOLP).  
Table 6.4 shows the CPT with the average generated power for each 
segment for three DG types: conventional, solar, and wind. The DG is assumed 
100% reliable and the number of states (n) is 10 (excluding the zero power output 
level). The rated capacity ratio (RCR) for the conventional, solar, and wind DG is 
0.5. As explained in (6.6), the rated capacity ratio is the ratio between the 
nameplate capacity of the DG and the annual peak demand.  
      
                      
                  
 (6.6) 
Table 6.5 demonstrates the DPT for the three types of customers 
(residential, commercial, and industrial). The residential annual peak demand 
occurs during a short period of time in the summer and winter and can be 
neglected from the DPT.  
The LOLP for the three DG types (conventional, solar, and wind) and the 
three customers sectors (residential, commercial, and industrial) are shown in 
Table 6.6. The DG unit is assumed to be 100% reliable when it is needed. The 
smallest LOLP occurs when the residential customer installs a conventional DG 
to supply the local load. The largest LOLP occurs when a solar DG is used to 
supply the industrial load during interruptions. 
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(RCR=0.5) 



































































































0 0 0 0 0 4003 0.000 0.457 3068 0.000 0.350 
1 0.0 - 0.1 0 0 0 1046 0.038 0.119 2226 0.028 0.254 
2 0.1 - 0.2 0 0 0 743 0.151 0.085 662 0.146 0.076 
3 0.2 - 0.3 0 0 0 973 0.255 0.111 510 0.247 0.058 
4 0.3 - 0.4 0 0 0 1027 0.349 0.117 532 0.353 0.061 
5 0.4 - 0.5 8760 0.5 1 968 0.455 0.111 1762 0.475 0.201 
6 0.5 - 0.6 0 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 0.000 
7 0.6 - 0.7 0 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 0.000 
8 0.7 - 0.8 0 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 0.000 
9 0.8 - 0.9 0 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 0.000 
10 0.9 - 1 0 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 0.000 
 












































































































0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 0.000 
1 0.0 - 0.1 0 0.000 0.000 2920 0.017 0.333 0 0.000 0.000 
2 0.1 - 0.2 0 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 0.000 
3 0.2 - 0.3 837 0.276 0.096 365 0.300 0.042 0 0.000 0.000 
4 0.3 - 0.4 1857 0.348 0.212 365 0.350 0.042 2190 0.337 0.250 
5 0.4 - 0.5 1357 0.449 0.155 0 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 0.000 
6 0.5 - 0.6 1793 0.553 0.205 0 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 0.000 
7 0.6 - 0.7 1838 0.650 0.210 0 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 0.000 
8 0.7 - 0.8 916 0.744 0.105 365 0.750 0.042 0 0.000 0.000 
9 0.8 - 0.9 162 0.818 0.018 2555 0.866 0.292 0 0.000 0.000 
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Residential 0.5376 0.9128 0.8883 
Commercial 0.5833 0.8049 0.7616 
Industrial 0.7500 0.9431 0.9345 
 
Fig. 6.15 demonstrates the impact of the RCR value on the LOLP of the 
residential, commercial, and industrial sites if a conventional DG is connected. In 
Fig. 6.16, the impact of the solar RCR on the LOLP is shown for different 
customers.  
 
Fig. 6.15 LOLP for different conventional DG RCR and different load sectors 
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6.5 DG Islanded System Reliability Integration 
To evaluate the reliability of a networked distribution system including the 
DG, the DG and load models need to be integrated with the distribution system 
and its components. The load will receive the base load supply from the utility 
supply and the distribution connections. If the distribution system fails to supply 
the demand, the load will be disconnected from the distribution system and 
connected to the DG islanded system. The DG system model consists of the 
adequacy of the DG output power to supply the demand during the interruption, 
the DG mechanical operation, and the successful starting and switching the DG.  
Successful DG starting and switching to disconnect the utility supply and 
connect the DG can be modeled as the probability to start and switch the DG 
when needed (PSS) with a repair rate equal to (μSS). The starting and switching 
probability can be calculated as follows:  
    
                               
                                    
  (5.7) 
For the distribution system model in Fig. 6.17, the conditions under which the 
load experiences an interruption are:  
 When the distribution connection system fails and the DG fails to start;  
 When the distribution connection system fails and the switches fail to 
isolate the DG with the load;   
 When the distribution connection system fails and the DG fails because of 
an internal mechanical failure; or  
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 When the distribution connection system fails and the DG power output is 
not adequate to supply the full demand.  
When the DG is assumed to be 100% reliable and the probability to start 
and switch equal to one, the system can be modeled with the four states Markov 
model. Table 6.7 demonstrates the states and the status of each state, and Fig. 6.17 
shows the state transition diagram (STD) and the state transition matrix (STM) for 
the distribution system model.  
Table 6.7 Distribution system model states (DG is 100% reliable and PSS=1) 
State DG Adequacy Main Supply Load Status 
1 11 1 1 U 
2 01 0 1 U 
3 10 1 0 U 


























        
        
        






Fig. 6.17 STD and STM for the distribution system model (DG is 100% reliable 
and PSS=1) 
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This model is suitable for both the conventional and renewable DG units in 
which the system will experience an outage only when the distribution connection system 
fails and the generated DG power is not adequate to fully supply the demand. The 
transition rate (   ) is the failure rate of the distribution connection system from the 
EMCS analysis, and the repair rate (   ) is the equivalent repair rate for each load to 
repair the fault in the system connection or its components.  
As shown in Fig. 6.18, the transition (λxy) is the transition to move from a 
working state (x), where the DG power capacity is greater than the demand to a 
failing state (y), and where the load demand is greater than the generated DG 
power. Similarly, the transition (λyx) represents the transition of changing the 








Fig. 6.18 Two states representation of the DG adequacy model 
In general, the transition (λxy) can be computed as follows:  
  
    
                                          
                     
 
   
  
 (6.8) 
For each load demand level ( ), the transition (   
 ) is calculated by 
counting the number of transitions from state x (where the DG power capacity is 
greater than the load demand) to state y (where the DG power capacity is less than 
the load demand). This number is then divided by the total time spent in state x.  
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The total transition rate (   ) is calculated by multiplying each transition 
rate (   
 ) for each load demand level ( ) by the probability to stay in the level ( ) 
as explained in (6.9) and (6.10),  
       
       
         
    (6.9) 
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  (6.10) 
The transition (     is calculated using a similar method, as shown in (6.11) and 
(6.12), 
       
       
         
    (6.11) 
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 (6.12) 
The mean times to move from state x to state y or from state y to x are the 
reciprocals of     and     respectively. In Table 6.8, the transition rates (    and 
   ) are calculated for the different combinations of the DG units and load 
customers.  
Table 6.8 Adequacy transition rates and the mean time for each state 
 DG (RCR=0.5)     Txy     Txy 
Residential 
Conventional  800.1 10.9 686.4 12.8 
Solar  1314.4 6.7 476.5 18.4 
Wind  929.8 9.4 374.6 23.4 
Commercial 
Conventional  876.0 10.0 625.7 14.0 
Solar  3025.0 2.9 388.9 22.5 
Wind  2099.8 4.2 445.5 19.7 
Industrial 
Conventional  1460.0 6.0 485.3 18.1 
Solar  6815.6 1.3 159.5 54.9 
Wind  6574.8 1.3 131.7 66.5 
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To integrate the DG mechanical failure into the model shown in Fig. 6.17, 
the model is modified to include the DG failure states. As shown in Table 6.9, the 
system has 8 states and it is down when the distribution main supply and the DG 
adequacy state are down or when the main supply and the DG mechanical part are 
in a state of failure.   
Table 6.9 Distribution system model states (DG is not 100% reliable and PSS=1) 
State DG failure DG Adequacy Main Supply Load Status 
1 111 1 1 1 U 
2 101 1 0 1 U 
3 011 0 1 1 U 
4 001 0 0 1 U 
5 110 1 1 0 U 
6 100 1 0 0 D 
7 010 0 1 0 D 
8 000 0 0 0 D 
 
Fig. 6.19 shows the STD and STM for the distribution system when the 
DG can fail due to a mechanical failure and Pss is equal to one. The model shown 
in Fig. 6.19 is for the renewable DG units, where the DG is used as a base load 
unit to supply the load. This DG unit can fail mechanically at any time during the 
normal operation (the transitions from state 1 to 3 and from state 2 to 4). The only 
difference between the renewable and conventional DGs in the distribution 
system model is the DG failure during normal operation. In the conventional DG, 
there is no DG mechanical failure during normal system operation; the DG is used 
as a backup generator that operates only during outages. Therefore, there is no 
transition from state 1 to 3 or from state 2 to 4 when the conventional DG unit is 
considered in the analysis.  


















































              
              
              
              
              
              
              










Fig. 6.19 STD and the STM for the distribution system model including 
renewable DG (DG is not 100% reliable and PSS=1) 
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The last stage for the complete system model includes the probability of 
starting and switching the DG to the model as shown in Table 6.10. Some states 
in Table 6.10 (states 11–16) are considered unrealistic states and are removed 
from the state space.  
In Fig. 6.20, the STD and STM are shown for the completed system model 
including the renewable DG. The system model including conventional DG will 
be similar to the model in Fig. 6.20, except that the transition from state 1 to 3 and 
state 2 to 4 will be zero.  
 










1 1111 1 1 1 1 U 
2 1101 1 1 0 1 U 
3 0011 0 0 1 1 U 
4 0001 0 0 0 1 U 
5 1110 1 1 1 0 U 
6 1100 1 1 0 0 D 
7 0010 0 0 1 0 D 
8 0000 0 0 0 0 D 
9 0110 0 1 1 0 D 
10 0100 0 1 0 0 D 
11 1011 1 0 1 1 X 
12 1010 1 0 1 0 X 
13 1001 1 0 0 1 X 
14 1000 1 0 0 0 X 
15 0111 0 1 1 1 X 
16 0101 0 1 0 1 X 































































                            
                            
                
                
                
                
                
                
                














Fig. 6.20 STD and the STM for the distribution system model including 
renewable DG (DG is not 100% reliable and PSS≠1) 
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6.6 Future Distribution System Reliability Analysis Including DG  
The Bus 4 of the RBTS (shown in Fig. 5.2) is used to evaluate the 
reliability of the networked distribution system including DG. All the load points 
and their customer types and reliability data can be found in Appendix B. The 
small industrial users are assumed to have the same load model as the industrial 
load demonstrated in Section 6.3. The DG is connected at the load points (LP 1–
LP 38), and the load duration curve at each load point is the aggregated load 
demand for all the customers connected to that bus. If the DG connected at load 
bus (x) cannot supply the full aggregated load demand, the DG will be 
disconnected from all customers connected to bus (x). The general flow diagram 
for the complete reliability analysis including DG is shown in Fig. 6.21.  
The A, AIF, and AID for LP 1 are calculated using Markov model 
analysis. Different cases included in Table 6.20 where Case 0 is the original case 
without DG, Case 1 is the case where the DG is assumed to be 100 % reliable, 
and PSS is unity (Fig. 6.17). Case 2 is the case where the DG can fail when it is 
needed and PSS is unity (Fig. 6.19). Finally, Case 3 is the case where the DG can 
fail and the PSS is not unity (Fig. 6.20). The RCR is considered to be 0.5 for all 
types of DGs and the distribution system failure rate and repair rate from the 
EMCS analysis are equal to 0.054 f/y and 148.11 r/y, respectively. The DG failure 
rate is considered to be 4 f/y for the conventional DG and 2 f/y for the solar and 
wind DG. The repair time is assumed to be 48 h. The probability to start and 
switch DG is assumed to be 0.95 with repair time equals to 12 h. To study the 
effect of different types of customers and DG units, the customers at LP 1 can be 
  114 
either residential, commercial, or industrial and the DG type can be conventional, 
solar, or wind. The load reliability indices for LP 1 are shown in Table 6.11.  
Distribution System 
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Fig, 6.21 Flow chart for the distribution system reliability analysis including DG 
  
Table 6.11 Load reliability indices for LP 1 – RBTS Bus 4 
  






















 Conventional 0.999804 0.1638 1.7191 0.999787 0.1646 1.8632 0.999726 0.1733 2.3971 
Solar 0.999732 0.1671 2.3442 0.999677 0.1735 2.8301 0.999644 0.1096 3.1209 





 Conventional 0.999802 0.1628 1.7367 0.999785 0.1636 1.8791 0.999725 0.1721 2.4067 
Solar 0.999731 0.1661 2.3534 0.999676 0.1723 2.8341 0.999644 0.1090 3.1217 





 Conventional 0.999800 0.1629 1.7490 0.999784 0.1636 1.8902 0.999725 0.1717 2.4133 
Solar 0.999731 0.1658 2.3604 0.999676 0.1715 2.8371 0.999644 0.1086 3.1223 
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Fig. 6.22 shows the AIF and AID percentage change from the original 
case when different DG units connected at LP 1 were the customers sector can be 
residential, commercial, or industrial. The AIF increases for all the DG types 
because of the increased frequency of changing the DG adequacy states. This 
change is due to the fluctuating weather conditions (or the load demand) during 
interruptions. On the other hand, the AID improves (decreases) and the maximum 
improvement for all the customer types occurs when the conventional type DG is 
connected. 
 
Fig. 6.22 AIF and AID percentage change when DG is connected at LP 1– RBTS 
Bus 4 
In Table 6.12, the system reliability indices (SAIFI and SAIDI) are 
calculated when different types of loads and DGs are connected to LP 1. Fig. 6.23 
shows that the maximum SAIFI increase of 9% occurs when the load is 
commercial and wind DG is installed at the load site. The lowest SAIFI increase 
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other hand, SAIDI decreases by almost 2% when the conventional DG is 
connected at the residential load.  
Table 6.12 System reliability indices – RBTS Bus 4 
 














No DG 0.0620 3.2261 0.0616 3.2261 0.0616 3.2261 
Conventional  0.0670 3.1596 0.0666 3.1661 0.0670 3.1902 
Solar  0.0667 3.1878 0.0670 3.2097 0.0641 3.2228 
Wind  0.0653 3.1847 0.0672 3.2009 0.0636 3.2233 
 
 
Fig. 6.23 SAIFI and SAIDI percentage change when DG is connected at LP 1– 
RBTS Bus 4 
In Figs. 6.24 and 6.25, the reliability indices are calculated to study the 
effect of installing different DG units at each load point in the system. As shown 
in Fig. 6.24, SAIFI is improved when the DG unit is connected at the industrial 
sites. With the absence of the transformers in the calculation of the reliability at 
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most improvement in SAIDI occurs when the DG units connected to the industrial 
sites.  
 
Fig. 6.24 SAIFI when DG unit is connected at each load point – RBTS Bus 4 
 
Fig. 6.25 SAIDI when DG unit is connected at each load point – RBTS Bus 4 
In Figs. 6.26 and 6.27, the total RCR percentage of the DG in the system 
is varied and the system reliability indices are calculated. For each percentage 
level in Figs 6.26 and 6.27, one DG with RCR=0.5 is added by order to each load 
point in the system. The maximum system percentage is 50 % since the RCR for 
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Fig. 6.26 SAIFI for different system RCR percentage levels – RBTS Bus 4 
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Chapter 7 
CONCLUSIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND FUTURE WORK 
7.1 Conclusions and Contributions 
The research work discussed in this report is concerned with the 
evaluation of the reliability of future networked distribution systems. The 
following main conclusions and contributions are presented in this thesis: 
 An innovative analytical reliability analysis method has been developed 
and illustrated for a distribution system. The algorithm is termed the 
EMCS (encoded Markov cut set) algorithm. 
 The reliability calculation is done in the design phase and is off-line; 
however, because of the combinatorial nature of the calculation, the 
calculation time is an important factor. Two concepts are used to automate 
the reliability calculation: Petri nets and prime number encoding, the main 
components of the EMCS algorithm. Petri nets and prime number 
encoding offer a consistent way to calculate system and load reliability. 
The Petri nets concept is used to identify the minimal tie sets of the 
networked distribution system. Prime number encoding is used to classify 
each remaining set in the state space as a tie set, cut set, or minimal cut 
set. Finally, the cut and tie sets are used to calculate the load and system 
reliability indices using Markov models.  
 The size of the state space and the transition matrix used in the Markov 
models are proportional to the number of components in the system. 
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Different reduction and truncation techniques are used in this research to 
reduce the state space in each load point reliability computation. The 
proposed techniques reduced the number of states and transition matrix 
size without affecting computation accuracy. 
 The advantage of using prime number encoding is the added flexibility 
and the speed to identify, locate, and extract the tie and cut sets from the 
set population.  
 The method shown is algorithmic and does not introduce bias into the 
calculation of reliability; therefore, the method appears suitable for the 
evaluation of alternate designs of future distribution networks. The 
computation time improves when using the proposed algorithm. This is 
compared to a previous study [75] in which different Monte Carlo 
simulation techniques were used to evaluate the reliability of the RBTS. 
The reduction in computation time permits the analysis of a wider range of 
operating strategies and larger systems. 
 The stochastic nature of the renewable DG power output and load demand 
is integrated successfully into the EMCS algorithm. This will make the 
EMCS capable of evaluating the networked distribution system including 
the renewable DGs. An adequacy transition rate is extracted from the DG 
annual power output data and the load duration curve that will be used in 
the Markov model analysis. The capacity probability table for the DG and 
demand probability table are computed and utilized in the DG adequacy 
assessment and distribution system model integration.  
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 The annual DG power output data for the conventional, solar, and wind 
DGs are used to generate the capacity probability table (CPT) in which the 
aggregated time, the probability, and the arithmetic average for each 
power output state are computed and used to assess DG adequacy. 
Similarly, the load duration curves for the residential, commercial, and 
industrial customers are used to generate the demand probability table 
(DPT). Different rated capacity ratios (RCRs) for different DG units and 
load sectors can be used to assess the impact of each DG unit and 
customer type on the reliability indices.  
 The reliability evaluation of the networked distribution system is modified 
to account for the DG failure and repair rates, as well as the probability of 
starting and switching the DG islanding mode. 
 For a single customer with DG, if the DG size supports the demand load 
and can be started successfully in a short time, the local load can 
experience shorter sustained interruption duration and may experience 
only momentary interruptions. The presence of the DG at the customer 
side may improve the load reliability indices as a result of supplying the 
load in the islanding mode operation. The system reliability indices might 
not be affected if the penetration of the DG in the system is very low.   
 The DG may not be able to supply the load demand completely during 
interruptions. This is due to the availability and the rating capacity ratio 
(RCR) of the DG, especially if the DG is based on the intermittent 
renewable resources.  
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 The DG operating in islanding mode during outages can improve the 
interruption duration but can also lead to an increase in the interruption 
frequency. A renewable DG may perhaps increase the probability of 
experiencing inadequate power production due to the low capacity factor 
for the renewable based DG.  
 The EMCS algorithm proposed in this research contributes to the 
reliability analysis of the future distribution systems including the 
conventional and renewable DGs. Case studies showed that the proposed 
algorithm can be a useful tool for distribution network planning and 
reconfiguration as it predicts the reliability performance of the system 
after any expansion and quantifies the impact of adding new components 
or DGs to the system.  
7.2 Future Work  
The following are recommendations for future work: 
 Practical experience is needed including the application of these methods 
for real systems. 
 An efficient approach needs to be developed to design (i.e., system 
planning) a distribution system to optimize the reliability indices under 
given constraints. The number and locations of new components needed to 
improve the reliability indices to specified values can then be identified 
and studied.  
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 Interruption devices should also be modeled and integrated into the 
proposed algorithm. Different failure modes for each interruption device 
in a distribution system should also be considered.  
 Based on the future vision of the distribution intelligent network 
(microgrid), the DG is connected on the local load but allowed to supply 
other loads on the feeder. Alternatively, the DG is connected on the main 
feeder where it can supply group of loads during the interruption and 
restore the service to the customers as fast as possible. Evaluating the 
distribution system with smart restoration capability is a challenging issue, 
and the protection devices, switching time, restoration ranking techniques 
should be included in the study.  
 The distribution system feeders and components are assumed to have 
sufficient capacity in this research. Including the capacity limits for the 
feeders in the system will require conducting a power flow study to 
validate the system states and make sure that the capacity of the system’s 
feeders are not violated.  
 An approach to classify and categorized the down states is another area of 
research. The down states can be classified based on the outage cost of 
each state, the time to repair, or frequency of occurrence of each state.  
 The time correlation between the renewable DG power output and the load 
demand should be considered in the analysis. The influence of the time of 
the day can affect the adequacy of the DG to supply the load. 
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The most common reliability indices used in distribution systems are 
SAIDI and SAIFI. They reflect the reliability of the system in terms of the 
frequency and duration of sustained interruptions. The Customer average 
interruption duration index (CAIDI) is also used to evaluate the average response 
time of each utility to clear the fault and restore the service to each customer. 
Other indices that can be used to evaluate the reliability performance of the 
distribution system may include [39]: 
- Customer average interruption duration index (CAIDI) 
- Average service availability index (ASAI) 
- Average service unavailability index (ASUI) 
- Energy not supplied (ENS) (also termed ‘energy unserved’) 
These indices may not be as widespread in use for utilities and customers as 
SAIFI, SAIDI and CAIDI, but they can be useful measures in some complex 
systems and specific applications. CAIDI is the average duration of each 
interruption seen by each interrupted customer. CAIDI captures the average time 
that the utility responds by measuring the average time to restore service. The 
difference between SAIDI and CAIDI is that in SAIDI the total duration of all 
interruptions averaged by the total number of customers connected to the system. 
CAIDI, on the other hand, is only averaged by the customers interrupted in each 
outage event. 
      
                                           
                                      
 
     
     
 (A.1) 
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The ASAI is the measure of service availability during a given period. It is 
calculated by dividing the number of hours when service available to the 
customers by the total number of demand hours for all customers. 
     
                                  
                  
 
     
          
    
 (A.2) 
Similarly, ASUI can be calculated from the ASAI,  
     
                                    
                  
 
            
     
    
 (A.3) 
To report the total energy not supplied by the system during the outages, 
ENS can be used and calculated as, 
                              
    ∑           (A.4) 
where Pavg can be calculated as, 
      
                            
    
 (A.5) 
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Tables B.1 – B.6 document the system data for the RBTS [58]. 
 























2, 6, 10, 14, 17, 
21, 25, 28, 30, 34 
0.60 0.03900 1752 5 0.024 292 30 
1, 4, 7, 9, 12, 16, 
19, 22, 24, 27, 
29, 32, 35 
0.75 0.04875 1752 5 0.030 292 30 
3, 5, 8, 11, 13, 
15, 18, 20, 23, 
26, 31, 33, 36 
0.80 0.05200 1752 5 0.032 292 30 
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Table B.3 Load data – RBTS Bus 2 







1 F1 Residential 0.535 0.8668 210 
2 F1 Residential 0.535 0.8668 210 
3 F1 Residential 0.535 0.8668 210 
4 F1 Gov/Inst 0.566 0.9167 1 
5 F1 Gov/Inst 0.566 0.9167 1 
6 F1 Commercial 0.454 0.75 10 
7 F1 Commercial 0.454 0.75 10 
8 F2 Small user 1 1.6279 1 
9 F2 Small user 1.15 1.8721 1 
10 F3 Residential 0.535 0.8668 210 
11 F3 Residential 0.535 0.8668 210 
12 F3 Residential 0.45 0.7291 200 
13 F3 Gov/Inst 0.566 0.9167 1 
14 F3 Gov/Inst 0.566 0.9167 1 
15 F3 Commercial 0.454 0.75 10 
16 F4 Commercial 0.454 0.75 10 
17 F4 Residential 0.45 0.7291 200 
18 F4 Residential 0.45 0.7291 200 
19 F4 Residential 0.45 0.7291 200 
20 F4 Gov/Inst 0.566 0.9167 1 
21 F4 Gov/Inst 0.566 0.9167 1 
22 F4 Commercial 0.454 0.75 10 
 



















33/11 0.015 - - 584 15 
11/0.415 0.015 43.8 200 876 10 


























2, 6, 10, 14, 17, 21, 
25, 28, 30, 34, 38, 
41, 43, 46, 49, 51, 
55, 58, 61, 64, 67 
11 0.60 0.03900 1752 5 0.024 292 30 
1, 4, 7, 9, 12, 16, 
19, 22, 24, 27, 29, 
32, 35, 37, 40, 42, 
45, 48, 50, 53, 56, 
60, 63, 65 
11 0.75 0.04875 1752 5 0.030 292 30 
3, 5, 8, 11, 13, 15, 
18, 20, 23, 26, 31, 
33, 36, 39, 44, 47, 
52, 54, 57, 59, 62, 
66 
11 0.80 0.05200 1752 5 0.032 292 30 
68, 69 33 15 0.69 1095 8 - - - 







Table B.6 Load data – RBTS Bus 4 







1 F1 Residential 0.545 0.8869 220 
2 F1 Residential 0.545 0.8869 220 
3 F1 Residential 0.545 0.8869 220 
4 F1 Residential 0.545 0.8869 220 
5 F1 Residential 0.500 0.8137 200 
6 F1 Commercial 0.415 0.6714 10 
7 F1 Commercial 0.415 0.6714 10 
8 F2 Small user 1 1.63 1 
9 F2 Small user 1.5 2.445 1 
10 F2 Small user 1 1.63 1 
11 F3 Residential 0.545 0.8869 220 
12 F3 Residential 0.545 0.8869 220 
13 F3 Residential 0.545 0.8869 220 
14 F3 Residential 0.500 0.8137 200 
15 F3 Residential 0.500 0.8137 200 
16 F3 Commercial 0.415 0.6714 10 
17 F3 Commercial 0.415 0.6714 10 
18 F4 Residential 0.545 0.8869 220 
19 F4 Residential 0.545 0.8869 220 
20 F4 Residential 0.545 0.8869 220 
21 F4 Residential 0.545 0.8869 220 
22 F4 Residential 0.500 0.8137 200 
23 F4 Residential 0.500 0.8137 200 
24 F4 Commercial 0.415 0.6714 10 
25 F4 Commercial 0.415 0.6714 10 
26 F5 Small user 1 1.63 1 
27 F5 Small user 1 1.63 1 
28 F5 Small user 1 1.63 1 
29 F6 Small user 1 1.63 1 
30 F6 Small user 1 1.63 1 
31 F6 Small user 1.5 2.445 1 
32 F7 Residential 0.545 0.8869 220 
33 F7 Residential 0.545 0.8869 220 
34 F7 Residential 0.545 0.8869 220 
35 F7 Residential 0.545 0.8869 220 
36 F7 Residential 0.500 0.8137 200 
37 F7 Residential 0.500 0.8137 200 




























%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% THE MAIN PROGRAM %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%  
  
%% PROGRAM USES SUB-ROUTINES TO EVALUATE THE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 
RELIABILITY USING EMCS ALGORITHM.  
  
%%THE SUB-ROUTINES INCLUDE:  
%%REDUCTION TECHNIQUES 
%%PRIME NUMBER ENCODING 
%%CREATING MASTER LIST 
%%FINDING TIE SETS USING PETRI NETS CONCEPT 
%%FINDING CUT SETS USING PRIME NUMBER ENCODING 
%%BUILDING THE MARKOV TRANSITION MATRIX 
%%BUILDING Q-MATRIX AND P-MATRIX  
%%CALCULATING MTTF  
%%CALCULATING THE STEADY STATE PROBABILITIES 
%%CALCULATING THE LOAD INDICES  
  
%% AUTHOR: ALMUHAINI, MOHAMMAD 
%% REFERENCE: PhD DISSERTATION 














clearvars -except A1 RRR FRR AveragePower NumberOfCustomers vaa 
maxcutset states nodes lines ss glimit Availability 
Unavailability MeanTimeToFailure Frequency TotalFrequency 
NumberOfNodes NumberOfLines NumberOfStates MasterList CutSets LL 










[A,L,M] = loadsred(A,LLL,L,M); 
A=sparse(A); 
s=size(A); 







[M, A,x,xx,RR,FR,L, va,nodes,lines, states] = reduction2(A,RR,FR, 
M,L, xxz, va,nodes,lines, states,loads); 
  
%%PRIME NUMBER ENCODING 
xx2=1:x; 
aa=(2^x); 
[ng, gul, sss, sss2,l1]= primeindex(x,ss,glimit); 
  
%%CREATING MASTER LIST 
[eeeee, eee2]  = mlist2(maxcutset, aa, x, ss, sss, xx2, glimit, 
gul, ng, l1); 
  
%%FINDING TIE SETS USING PETRI NETS CONCEPT 
siz=size(eee2); aa=siz(1,1); 
[eee2, tiepath, enc,enc2]  = pathsets(M, A, aa, x, xx, sss, eee2, 
ng, l1); 
  
%%FINDING CUT SETS USING PRIME NUMBER ENCODING 
[eee2, eeeee, cutset]  = cutsets(aa, x , eee2, eeeee, ng); 
  
%%BUILDING THE MARKOV TRANSITION MATRIX 
[aaa, qmatrix]  = qmat(x, eeeee, eee2, sss, RR, FR, ng, sss2);  
  
%%BUILDING Q-MATRIX AND P-MATRIX   
[Qmatrix, Pmatrix, PP]  = QPmat(qmatrix, aaa); 
  
%%CALCULATING MTTF  
[Qmatrix2, MTTF]  = MTTFF(Pmatrix, eee2, aaa, ng); 
  
%%CALCULATING THE STEADY STATE PROBABILITIES  
[xxx]=invv(Qmatrix,PP); 
  
%%CALCULATING THE LOAD INDICES  
[AA, UU, freq, tfreq, qmatrix2, qmatrix3,eee4] = AUf(xxx,aaa, 




























% Interruption Frequency 
Reliability(:,6)=TotalFrequency; 























































































Tables D.1 – D.3 document the load data for the RBTS [82, 83]. 
 
Table D.1 Weekly residential sector fraction 
Week Weekly Percentage Week Weekly Percentage 
1 0.922 27 0.815 
2 0.96 28 0.876 
3 0.938 29 0.861 
4 0.894 30 0.94 
5 0.94 31 0.782 
6 0.901 32 0.836 
7 0.892 33 0.86 
8 0.866 34 0.789 
9 0.8 35 0.786 
10 0.797 36 0.765 
11 0.775 37 0.84 
12 0.787 38 0.755 
13 0.764 39 0.784 
14 0.81 40 0.784 
15 0.781 41 0.803 
16 0.86 42 0.804 
17 0.814 43 0.86 
18 0.897 44 0.941 
19 0.93 45 0.945 
20 0.94 46 0.969 
21 0.916 47 1 
22 0.871 48 0.95 
23 0.96 49 0.975 
24 0.947 50 0.97 
25 0.956 51 0.98 





Table D.2 Hourly fraction of the sector peak load for residential, commercial, and 
industrial customers 
Hour Average Residential Day Average  Commercial Day Industrial 
1 0.55 0.01 0.337 
2 0.5 0.01 0.337 
3 0.43 0.01 0.337 
4 0.37 0.01 0.337 
5 0.36 0.01 0.337 
6 0.38 0.03 0.337 
7 0.385 0.04 1 
8 0.425 0.25 1 
9 0.45 0.85 1 
10 0.55 0.9 1 
11 0.6 0.91 1 
12 0.7 0.92 1 
13 0.7 0.985 1 
14 0.75 0.975 1 
15 0.75 0.88 1 
16 0.75 0.865 1 
17 0.8 0.89 1 
18 0.85 0.9 1 
19 0.85 0.9 1 
20 0.86 0.64 1 
21 0.86 0.6 1 
22 0.8 0.42 1 
23 0.75 0.4 1 
24 0.65 0.025 1 
 
Table D.3 Daily fraction of the residential, commercial, and industrial peak load 
Day Residential Commercial Industrial 
Monday 0.96 1 1 
Tuesday 1 1 1 
Wednesday 0.98 1 1 
Thursday 0.96 1 1 
Friday 0.97 1 1 
Saturday 0.83 1 1 
Sunday 0.81 1 1 
 
